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The Consumer Protection Act (CPA) and conflict of laws: Does the CPA 
provide mandatory protections in an international commercial transaction? 
CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION 
The Consumer Protection Act (‘the CPA’ or ‘the Act’)1 is a relatively new piece of 
legislation which was finally fully enacted in South Africa from 1 April 2011.2 The 
intended and potential application of the CPA is vast – from seemingly 
straightforward defined consumer sales, to services offered by clubs and 
associations, to franchise arrangements, and to product liability cases irrespective of 
whether a consumer (as defined by the CPA) is involved in the transaction. 
It is clear that the standards set by the CPA were (and continue to be) relevant 
and necessary from a social, political and economic perspective.3 
The CPA was enacted to address certain fundamental components of the 
modern-day South African consumer marketplace. These include the promotion and 
protection of consumers’ economic interests; improved access to information to 
allow informed and individualised choices; protection from hazards that impact 
consumers’ health and well-being; developing effective means of redress; providing 
for consumer education; promoting free association of consumers and advocacy of 
their common interests; and encouraging consumers to participate in decisions 
relevant to the marketplace.4 
Notwithstanding its extensive application, the Act has not yet been fully tested 
by our courts. This is due to a number of reasons, not least of which is the 
legislature’s intention that the courts be a remedy of last resort.5 The Act is also still 
in the early stages of application. In particular, neither South African nor any foreign 
courts have considered whether the fundamental consumer protections established by 
the CPA are capable of elevation to mandatory provisions of private international 
law.6  Regrettably, the drafters of the CPA did not take the opportunity to state 
explicitly the position – the Act is silent on whether or not it is mandatory law which 
must apply despite a chosen law. This dissertation explores that question. 
                                                
1 Act 68 of 2008. 
2 Government Gazette Notice 917 of 201, No. 33581 dated 23 September 2010. 
3 Section 3(1). 
4 Preamble. 
5 Section 69. 
6 These terms are used interchangeably in this dissertation. 
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Recommendations on how this issue should be dealt with should it arise in a South 
African court, as well as in a selection of fora worldwide, will be made. 
The conflict of laws framework, including the concept of mandatory provisions 
(what they are and how they might apply) is explained in Chapter Two. The 
interaction between choice of law and mandatory provisions when determining the 
applicable law in an international commercial transaction is also addressed.  
Chapter Three briefly compares how mandatory provisions are treated in three 
relevant jurisdictions, namely South Africa, the European Union and Botswana. The 
position of an arbitrator in an international commercial arbitration is also discussed. 
The non-South African jurisdictions have been chosen as their consumer protection 
laws were referred to during the legislative drafting process leading up to the 
enactment of the CPA.7 These jurisdictions are additionally relevant from a 
commercial perspective. Botswana is a neighbouring country, member of the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC)8 and member of the Southern 
African Customs Union (SACU).9 The EU is significant because of, firstly, the 
volume of writing relating to mandatory provisions as they are applied in the EU, 
secondly, the regular case law generated by the European Court of Justice (‘the 
ECJ’) and, thirdly, being South Africa’s largest trading partner.10 
The courts in these jurisdictions may well be called upon to adjudicate a 
dispute in which the CPA is potentially applicable as a mandatory provision. The 
approach of the courts such disputes therefore must be considered.  To this list may 
be added countries including Uganda, Malawi, Brazil and Argentina, which were 
also informative in the drafting process. They have been omitted due to word limit 
and language constraints (particularly in the case of Brazil and Argentina where the 
bulk of the resources would be in Portuguese and Spanish respectively). 
Chapter Four provides a brief background to the CPA, specifically the need for 
the rights-based approach of the legislation. Mention is made of the definitions 
employed to define the scope of protections in some of the countries reviewed by the 
South African legislature during the drafting phase.  
                                                
7 Memorandum on the objects of the Consumer Protection Bill (B19D-2008). 
8 Southern African Development Community website available at http://www.sadc.int/, accessed on 4 
December 2013. 
9 Southern African Customs Union website available at http://www.sacu.int/, accessed on 4 December 
2013. 
10 WTO Trade Profiles 2013 1 at 168. 
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The application, scope and primary rights of the CPA are discussed in Chapter 
Five where the focus is on the scope of the CPA as set out in section 5 – to whom 
and when it applies, in what sort of transactions, and the extent to which a potential 
conflict with other laws has been addressed. 
Chapter Six deals with when and how the CPA might be considered mandatory 
law. Three examples are employed to illustrate this, canvassing ordinary B2C 
transactions, franchise agreements and the liability that can be imposed in terms of 
section 61 of the Act, which governs product liability cases. Comments are offered 
on the impact of the CPA on the entire (global) supply chain and the extent of 
potential liability for unsuspecting international goods traders. This chapter also 
considers the question of the recognition and enforcement in South Africa of a 
foreign judgment granted without consideration of the CPA. 
Finally, concluding thoughts will be offered on whether and when the CPA is 
to be considered mandatory.  
CHAPTER 2 : GENERAL BACKGROUND TO THE QUESTION OF 
CONFLICT OF LAWS AND MANDATORY PROVISIONS 
 The conflict of laws framework I
The rules regulating conflict of laws are those principles which apply to cases 
with a ‘foreign’ element: a connection with the system of law of at least one other 
country.11 Contracts establishing rights and obligations12 in which there is a foreign 
element are known as international or cross-border contracts,13 but this is not always 
clear. 
The element of ‘internationality’ has been elaborated by Basedow to include ‘a 
cross-border carriage of goods; the issue of offer and acceptance in different states; 
or the delivery of goods in a state other than the one of offer and acceptance’.14 
However, under the Vienna Sales Convention, the relevant elements for determining 
                                                
11 Dicey and Morris Conflict of Laws 14ed (2008) at 3; MRH De Villiers ‘Limitations on party 
autonomy in the context of cross-border consumer contracts: The South African position’ (2013) 
TSAR 478 at 479. 
12 As opposed to delictual or tortious duties and expectations, a discussion of which falls outside the 
scope of this dissertation. 
13 De Villiers (n11) at 479. 
14 Basedow ‘An EU law for cross-border sales only – its meaning and implications in open markets’ in 
Bonell et al (eds) Liber Amicorum Ole Lando (2012) 24 at 29 as cited in De Villiers (n11) at 479. 
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the ‘internationality’ of an agreement are the places of business of the seller and 
buyer. The fact that delivery may take place cross-border is not relevant.15  
Forsyth takes a wide view of cross-border trade and opines that ‘[t]he word 
‘international’ thus serves only to mark the existence of those foreign or international 
elements which raise the question of whether the lex fori is the appropriate law to 
apply, or not’.16 
The CPA is silent on what constitutes cross-border or international trade and 
the Act will generally apply when a transaction (as defined) occurs within South 
Africa. The meaning of ‘occurs’ is not defined in the Act, and is discussed in greater 
detail in Chapter Six. 
Contractual obligations between parties exist in terms of the ‘proper law’ of the 
contract. The proper law is the parties’ intended and chosen law (whether express or 
tacit/implied) or, in the absence of an intended choice, the legal norms and standards 
with which the parties’ contractual relationship enjoys the closest connection.17 The 
closest connection determination is usually made by a court or arbitrator after 
considering a range of different connecting factors which vary between fora.  
Generally, connecting factors account for, inter alia, where the contract was 
concluded, the place where performance was due or took place, the place where the 
parties were located at the time of contracting and the general nature of the 
contract.18    
Fundamentally, however, respect for the parties’ choice, whether express and 
clear, tacit or implied, derives its origins from the concept of party autonomy.19  The 
parties’ choice of law can operate in a limited or general manner. In a limited sense, 
the parties may elect to dispose of or override certain individual provisions of the law 
which would otherwise apply, if it were not for their choice. In the South African 
context, these provisions are known as the ius dispositivum, or those legal rules 
which may be derogated from by agreement.20  Forsyth uses the apt example of the 
Roman-Dutch law warranty against latent defects in a sale transaction which may be 
disposed of by agreement between the parties. The sale itself remains valid (the 
                                                
15 UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 1980 (the Vienna Sales 
Convention). 
16 Forsyth Private International Law 5ed (2012) at 5. 
17 Forsyth (n16) at 316-317. 
18 Connecting factors will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Two.  
19 De Villiers (n11) at 480-481; Forsyth (n16) at 317-318. 
20 Forsyth (n16) at 317-318. 
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essentialia are left untouched), but the additional purchaser’s protection offered by 
the warranty can be avoided by the seller, provided the purchaser agrees.21 
Alternatively, the parties may make a more general election and choose to 
dispose of the entire legal system which would otherwise automatically apply in 
favour of the legal system of their desires. The chosen system can be the law of a 
particular country or even an international convention which regulates (aspects of) 
the nature of their specific transaction such as the Vienna Sales Convention. 
The concept of party autonomy in conflict of laws is not, however, universally 
supported: its critics are vocal, although the world’s courts have largely ignored these 
concerns and relegated them to the realm of the academic.22 Some critics believe that 
the operation of party autonomy in this manner effectively means that the individual 
is allowed to supercede the law.23 The debate is not exclusively a local one: 
American and European academics recently famously discussed the issue of private 
rule making.24 
The critique is centred on the argument that the validity of the parties’ choice 
of law requires scrutiny under some legal system – it cannot operate in a vacuum 
simply because of the parties’ respective will.25 Further, neither can the 
determination of validity be made by applying the lex fori, which would (on their 
argument) create the logical difficulty of testing the validity of the choice against the 
laws of a place which had no relevance to the initial choice. The question of validity 
should, in their view, rather be determined by the application of the ‘true proper 
law’.26  
Despite these reservations, in practice and in recent legislation27 it has been 
accepted that the need for certainty and predictability in international trade (and in 
the supporting contracts regulating such trade) is enhanced when parties’ choice of 
                                                
21 Forsyth (n16) at 318. 
22 Ibid at 319. 
23 Ibid at 318. 
24 J Basedow, ‘The State’s Private Law and the Economy’ (56) 2008 American Journal of 
Comparative Law 703-721; DV Snyder, ‘Contract Regulation with and without the State: ruminations 
on rules and their sources. A comment on Basedow’ (56) 2008 American Journal of Comparative Law 
723-742; F Rödl, ‘Private law beyond the democratic order? On the legitimatory problem of private 
law “beyond the State”’ (56) 2008 American Journal of Comparative Law 743-767. 
25 E Spiro The General Principles of the Conflict of Laws (1982) at 27-28. 
26 Forsyth (n16) at 318-320.  
27 See articles 10 and 11 of the Rome I Regulation - EC Regulation 593/2008, which replaced the 
1980 Rome Convention of 19 June 1980 on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations. 
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law is respected.28 So too can parties’ reasonable expectations be met. The contrary 
would be the case if their choice was considered to be but one of a myriad factors 
potentially connecting the contract to a system of law, rather than (generally 
speaking) a definitive choice in and of itself.29   
The identification and operation of connecting factors can be an arduous task 
demanding of parties’ time and money. The commercial disadvantages of 
immediately disregarding party choice are further highlighted when one considers 
the volatile markets and fluctuations inherent in commodity trade. Approaching the 
courts or constituting an arbitral tribunal to determine which law applies, when the 
parties have ostensibly already debated their options and made a suitable mutual 
choice upfront,30 can be a lengthy, expensive and unnecessarily confrontational 
frustration which the individual parties, and world trade in general, can ill-afford.  
Respect for party choice accepts that the parties may have chosen a particular 
law to apply for specific reasons, even if there is no obvious link to the contract. A 
‘neutral’ third country law may have been chosen by the parties to ensure that they 
are equally disadvantaged at dispute resolution, to avoid any perceived bias of a 
particular legal system which might otherwise apply, to continue with a custom in 
their branch of trade (such as insurance contracts which often select English law as 
the applicable law), or if they are otherwise familiar with the laws of that third 
country.31 
Notwithstanding the above, there are some exceptions to the general rule held 
dear to most regimes that party autonomy is paramount and parties’ choice of 
applicable law should be respected.32 Schulze, addressing the challenges of off-shore 
joint venture agreements, confirms that party autonomy has its limits, despite the 
wide freedom it is generally given. Party choice will be respected provided the 
intention to select a particular law is bona fide, legal and not contrary to public 
policy.33 
                                                
28 C Roodt ‘The integration of substantive law interests and material justice in South African choice of 
law’ (2003) 36 Comp & Int’l Law Journal of South Africa 1 at 6.  
29 Forsyth (n16) at 319. 
30 Notwithstanding any inequalities in bargaining position. 
31 Forsyth (n16) at 320. 
32 Ibid at 318; E Spiro ‘Autonomy of the parties to a contract and the conflict of laws:  illegality’ 
(1984) 17 CILSA 197 at 197; Spiro (n25) at 28. 
33 W Schulze ‘Private international law and jurisdictional problems relating to offshore joint venture 
agreements’ (1995) CILSA 28 383 at 392. Schulze was discussing the approach of English law, but it 
is submitted that this is a universal approach – see De Villiers (n11) at 481-482. 
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When a particular country is connected to the contract, but the parties have 
intended and chosen another law to apply, the chosen law is applied as the proper 
law. However, if the parties have explicitly excluded the mandatory provisions of a 
legal system which is otherwise closely connected with the contract, courts34 may not 
simply accept this choice: it may be vital to respect the social, economic and political 
interests underpinning the relevant legislation to apply the mandatory provisions, 
which interests justify ousting the parties’ choice.35 Further, if there is one country 
which is wholly connected to the contract and the contract is entirely connected with 
that other state, the mandatory provisions of that wholly connected state will remain 
applicable, and cannot be avoided by the parties’ choice.36   
 Mandatory provisions II
This of course raises the question: What are mandatory provisions or rules?   
Dicey and Morris define mandatory rules as ‘rules of law which apply to 
contractual obligations irrespective of any contrary agreement’.37  Forsyth considers 
mandatory provisions to be ‘…the rules of a foreign legal system (that may render 
the contract void or unenforceable)’.38 In De Villiers’ view, ‘[m]andatory rules are 
rules the application (of) which cannot be excluded by contractual choice’.39  Put 
another way, these are provisions which are considered peremptory, and can 
effectively trump the traditional rules of conflict of laws to dictate that they should 
apply, rather than the chosen law.40   
Generally speaking, if parties have chosen a law to apply, relevant statutory 
and common law provisions will not necessarily have the effect of ousting the choice 
of law, and will not apply as mandatory law unless the provision is part of the chosen 
law or regulates procedure in the lex fori.41   
It is evident that mandatory rules can be understood in more than one way. 
Bermann succinctly summarises their dual meaning. In one sense, mandatory rules 
                                                
34 And, it is submitted, arbitral tribunals. 
35 Roodt (n28) at 13; Spiro (n25) at 9; Opinion of Advocate General Wahl in Case C-184/12 United 
Antwerp Maritime Agencies (Unamar) NV v Navigation Maritime Bulgare [2013] ECR at 33 with 
reference to Arblade and Others Cases C-319/96 and C-376/96 [1999] ECR I-8453. 
36 Dicey and Morris (n11) at 1242 para 32-129. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Forsyth (n16) at 344. Here, ‘foreign’ is used in the sense of it being different to the choice of 
applicable law. 
39 De Villiers (n11) at 484. 
40 Spiro (n32) at 197; Dicey and Morris (n11) at 21 para 1-049. 
41 Dicey and Morris (n11) at 21 para 1-049. 
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are those which cannot be derogated from by agreement between the parties. These 
are rules which are founded upon an essential public interest (notably the need to 
protect weaker parties) which justifies the absolute limitation of parties’ freedom of 
contract.42 These may be referred to as non-derogable mandatory rules. In the 
parlance of South African jurisprudence, these would do not form part of the ius 
dispositivum.43 In the EU, such rules are dealt with under article 3(3) of the Rome I 
Regulation.44 
Secondly, some rules might be considered mandatory if they must be applied 
by a court, despite the normal conflict rules pointing to an otherwise applicable law. 
Such norms and rules embody legal principles that are considered so vital that the 
otherwise applicable law is displaced,45 and these may be referred to as overriding 
mandatory provisions, as is done in the EU under article 9 of the Rome I Regulation. 
The two meanings are very closely connected, often confusingly so. When the 
parties’ chosen law is set aside in favour of a mandatory rule, both party autonomy 
and the conflict rules of the forum are rejected. The mandatory rule is thus applied 
despite the parties’ intention and the otherwise applicable law.46 However, this is not 
necessarily always and uniformly the case. If a rule falls under the first meaning of 
non-derogable mandatory law, and is a norm from which the parties are absolutely 
prohibited from avoiding or waiving contractually, their intention and conduct to the 
contrary must be (and is validly) ignored. Agreements which conflict with the rules 
under the second meaning of overriding mandatory law do not automatically suffer 
the same fate. Unlike non-derogable rules, overriding mandatory rules may indeed 
trump the otherwise applicable law (as determined by the usual conflict rules) but 
these mandatory rules could be avoided by agreement between the parties. It may 
thus be possible to waive the benefit of such rules provided this intention is 
expressed clearly enough.47 
Voet classified mandatory provisions as being either prohibitive or dispositive. 
Prohibitive statutes were those which could never be avoided, whilst dispositive 
                                                
42 G Bermann ‘Mandatory rules of law in international arbitration’ in Conflict of Laws in International 
Arbitration (2011) at 325-326. 
43 As discussed above at 4-5. 
44 Rome I Regulation (n27). 
45 Ibid at 325-326. 
46 Ibid at 326. 
47 Ibid at 327. This sophisticated distinction is evident in the Rome I Regulation on choice of law in 
contracts, specifically articles 3(3) and 9. See Chapter Three for further discussion. 
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statutes were capable of being ‘renounced’.48  This distinction did not, however, find 
favour with the Supreme Court of Appeal in the Classic Sailing case, which 
considered Voet’s approach and took the view that  
‘[r]ather than asking whether statutory provisions are prohibitory or dispositive, 
a better approach to determining whether parties may exclude the operation of 
statutory provisions by choice of another system of law might be to question 
whether they can waive the application of the provisions.’49 
 
The ability to waive application of mandatory provisions has been considered 
by the SCA, which held that provisions which affect public policy, interests or rights 
cannot be waived, even by a party for whose benefit such provisions were enacted.50 
The classification of the provisions as either non-derogable or overriding mandatory 
was neatly avoided.51 
Affording precedence to mandatory provisions in this manner is motivated by 
the fundamental need to avoid frustrating the parameters on contracting set by the 
legislature of the place most closely connected to the contract. In the absence of these 
measures, parties could simply and easily avoid onerous requirements or prohibitions 
of the most closely connected law in favour of a less restrictive foreign law.52 
The extent to which mandatory provisions may limit respect for party 
autonomy and the application of the chosen law is not clear-cut.53 It is clear that the 
intention of the legislature is key in determining the nature of a particular law and 
whether or not its benefits are derogable by agreement between the parties. The 
classification of a mandatory rule in this way is a notoriously difficult and unenviable 
task.54  
                                                
48 Representatives of Lloyd’s and others v Classic Sailing Adventures (Pty) Ltd [2010] 4 All SA 366 
(SCA) at 373 para 22. 
49 Ibid at 373 para 23. 
50 South African Co-Op Citrus Exchange Ltd v Director General Trade and Industry and another 
1997 (3) SA 236 (SCA) and De Jager and others v Absa Bank Bpk 2001 (3) 537 (SCA). The 
particular approach of the South African courts is canvassed in more detail in Chapter Three below. 
51 JP van Niekerk Choice of foreign law in a South African marine insurance policy: an unjustified 
limitation of party autonomy? (2011) TSAR 159 at 167. 
52 Irish Shipping Ltd v Commercial Union Assurance Co. plc [1991] 2 QB 206, 220-221 (CA) as cited 
in Dicey and Morris (n 11) at 21 para 1-049. 
53 Spiro (n25) at 28. 
54 Bermann (n42) at 329. 
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 The interaction between choice of law and mandatory provisions when III
determining the applicable law 
Mandatory provisions are potentially applicable in a wide range of different 
situations – there is no ‘one size fits all’ approach determining their application. 
Much will depend on, inter alia, where the contract is concluded, which foreign law 
is chosen or is the most closely connected to the contract, and the forum adjudicating 
the dispute.  
Certain categories of mandatory provisions may be identified and merit 
discussion in order to better understand their content and potential application:55 
mandatory provisions of the system which would apply if no law had been chosen; of 
the chosen system; of the forum (lex fori); and of a further legal system (which may 
or may not be connected to the contract). 
CHAPTER 3 : A COMPARISON OF THE APPLICABILITY OF 
MANDATORY PROVISIONS ACROSS THE GLOBE 
 
Contracts provide a ‘fertile ground for choice of law problems’.56 This chapter will 
briefly discuss how the conflict laws of South Africa, the European Union and 
Botswana deal with mandatory provisions in the contractual context. It will also deal 
with the position of an arbitrator in an international commercial arbitration.  
 South Africa  I
The South African rules of private international law (the conflict of laws rules) 
require that jurisdiction must first be established before the courts may embark on 
identifying the applicable law.  
(a) Jurisdiction 
Although parties are free to agree as to which court will have jurisdiction in the 
event of a dispute, this choice or submission is not necessarily absolutely respected 
by the court.57 Fundamentally, there must be some form of jurisdictional link 
between the parties and/or the dispute to the court.58 
                                                
55 The categories are drawn from Spiro (n32) at 197-208. 
56 RF Oppong Private International Law in Commonwealth Africa 1 at 131. 
57 Veneta Mineraria Spa v Carolina  Collieries (Pty) Ltd (In Liquidation) 1987 (4) SA 883 (A). 
58 Ibid; Forsyth (n16) at 217. 
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Submission to jurisdiction, which may take the form of a choice of court or 
consent clause, is accepted by most legal systems as a basis on which jurisdiction 
may be exercised,59 although such a choice is no guarantee of the effectiveness of 
any judgment. Provided the court deciding the matter is competent to properly 
exercise its jurisdiction, it should at least remain a valid judgment capable of 
enforcement notwithstanding the fact that no executable assets are located in that 
country.60  
In South Africa, a consent clause alone does not suffice – an additional 
jurisdictional link must be present.61 This position has been criticised for being 
unnecessarily limiting. 62 
The jurisdiction of the South African courts may thus be neatly avoided by 
inserting a consent clause referring disputes to a friendly court that does not 
recognise protective and mandatory rules of the law, such as those of where the 
consumer resides in a consumer contract. This is problematic, particularly in 
consumer disputes, as many consumer-supplier relationships are regulated under a 
standard form contract which automatically refers disputes to (usually) a foreign 
court.  
The consumer is not without recourse, though, and it has been held that parties 
cannot exclude the jurisdiction of South African courts by choice alone: the court 
will decide whether it will hear the matter or stay proceedings pending the findings 
of the forum which seemingly has ‘priority’ jurisdiction.63 Any submission to 
jurisdiction must not be vague, unconscionable, in violation of public policy or in 
fraudem legis64 and, as Forsyth pertinently notes, the right of access to courts is 
constitutionally guaranteed.65 A consumer could therefore challenge a consent clause 
on the basis that it violates public policy and unreasonably limits their right of access 
to justice.66 
If choice is not at issue and a plaintiff has a claim sounding in money (whether 
contractual or delictual), the general rule is that the court with jurisdiction over the 
                                                
59 Forsyth (n16) at 217, n359. 
60 Ibid at 217; E Spiro ‘Jurisdiction by Consent’ (1967) 84 SALJ 295 at 305-306. 
61 Veneta (n57); Forsyth (n16) at 217. 
62 C Forsyth ‘Provenance and future of private international law in Southern Africa’ (2002) TSAR 60 
at 74. 
63 See Forsyth (n16) at 218 and the cases cited in n372. 
64 Spiro (n60) at 302-303. 
65 Forsyth (n16) at 218. 
66 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996, sections 34 and 36. 
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defendant’s place of domicile can hear the dispute.67  The establishment of 
jurisdiction becomes more burdensome when the defendant is neither domiciled nor 
resident in South Africa (i.e. the defendant is a foreign peregrinus). In such a case, 
property belonging to the defendant must be attached in order to found or confirm 
jurisdiction.68 
Where a ground of jurisdiction already exists (for instance, a local cause of 
action), the prospective plaintiff must apply to the high court where the cause of 
action arose for an order authorising the attachment of the defendant respondent’s 
property to confirm jurisdiction.69 This is the only method available for a foreign 
peregrinus plaintiff seeking to sue a foreign peregrinus defendant.  
If the defendant is a foreign peregrinus, but the prospective plaintiff is 
domiciled or resides within the area of the court (i.e. is an incola of the court), 
attachment remains necessary, 70 but the applicant need only show that it has a prima 
facie claim and any judgment will be effective. 
Once jurisdiction has been established, the court will deal with the question of 
the applicable law in terms of its conflict of laws rules.71   
(b) Applicable law 
The mere fact that a South African court has jurisdiction to hear the dispute or 
that a South African is a party to the dispute does not necessarily mean that South 
African law will apply. Although it may be that South African law is determined to 
be applicable, the proper law of the contract could equally be a foreign law. This 
determination will primarily be done by looking to the parties’ intention – whether an 
express or implied choice was made.72   
There are, however, some issues relating to the contract which fall beyond the 
scope of the applicable law or the parties’ intention. Questions of the parties’ 
capacity to conclude the contract and other contractual formalities (such as whether 
the contract is required to be in writing or not, required for a valid sale of immovable 
                                                
67 Supreme Court Act, 59 of 1959, section 19; L Harms Civil Procedure in the Superior Courts 3ed 
(2003) at A-21; Forsyth (n16) at 221.  
68 Forsyth (n16) at 213 and 221; Supreme Court Act (n67), s 28(1). 
69 Harms (n67) at A-21. Claims falling within the jurisdiction of the Magistrate’s Court (under 
R100 000 in District courts and under R300 000 in Regional Courts) require all elements to arise 
within the jurisdiction of the court.  
70 Harms (n67) at A-21. 
71 Laconian Maritime Enterprises Ltd v Agromar Lineas Ltd 1986 (3) SA 509 (D). 
72 Forsyth (n16) at 325 and 327. 
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property in South Africa73) are to be determined under a holistic approach which 
scrutinises validity primarily in terms of the law of the place where the contract was 
concluded,74 but also considers the proper law or the law of the place where any 
immovable property is situated.75 
The parties’ intention is central to the determination of the applicable law. 
Their intention may have been clearly expressed in a choice of law clause, or it may 
have to be ascertained by the court if it was implicitly made.76 
If the parties have expressly chosen a law, the South African courts will 
generally respect their choice and apply the chosen law. The proper law will include 
the municipal (internal) laws of that country, but not its private international law 
rules. The exclusion of the chosen law’s conflict rules avoids the circularity of 
renvoi.77 
Identifying an implied choice by the parties demands consideration of a 
number of potentially relevant factors indicating whether an implied choice has been 
made and, if so, what that choice is. These can include the parties’ choice of forum 
(not in itself a conclusive indicator of choice)78; reference to legislation of a specific 
country; the location of relevant property; the residence, domicile and nationality of 
the parties; the place where the transaction is financed or insured; or whether there is 
a trade custom to select the laws of a particular jurisdiction.79  
If the parties have not expressly or tacitly chosen a law, the applicable law 
must be assigned by the court via an objective enquiry into which legal system has 
the closest connection to the contract. In this endeavour, the court is no longer 
concerned with the parties’ intention, but rather what system is most appropriately 
applied to their contract.80 
South African law entertains two theories on this enquiry: the intention theory 
and the most real connection theory.81 
According to the intention theory espoused in the Appellate Division82 case of 
Standard Bank v Efroiken83 (at a time prior to the current appreciation for an 
                                                
73 Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981. 
74 Ex parte Spinazza and Another NNO 1985 (3) SA 651 (A). 
75 Forsyth (n16) at 342-343. 
76 Ibid at 327. 
77 Ibid at 99-100; Oppong (n 55) at 3. 
78 Benidai Trading Co Ltd v Gouws & Gouws (Pty) Ltd 1977 (3) SA 1020 (T). 
79 Laconian (n71). 
80 Forsyth (n16) at 239-330. 
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objective methodology), the court must determine what law the parties ought to have 
chosen in light of the choices they did make. The case dealt with a claim by the 
appellant bank against its respondent clients for reimbursement of payments it had 
made under letters of credit. The clients had refused to reimburse the bank because 
the bank had honoured the letters against presentation of non-conforming documents. 
In order to analyse what would have constituted conforming documents, the court 
had to determine the applicable law in the absence of choice by the parties.  
The court held that  
‘… it must not be forgotten that the intention of the parties to the contract is the true 
criterion to determine by what law its interpretation and effect are to be 
governed…[b]ut… where parties did not give the matter a second thought, courts of law 
have of necessity to fall back upon what ought, reading the contract by the light of the 
subject matter and of the surrounding circumstances, to be presumed to have been the 
intention of the parties’.84  
 
Ultimately it was found that, although the principal sale contract was 
concluded in South Africa, performance by the seller (namely presentation of 
conforming documents) and payment by the bank’s agents against such presentation 
was to have taken place in the United States. Accordingly, United States law applied 
to the letters of credit, under which the documents presented for payment to the bank 
were deficient, and should not have been honoured by the bank.85  
The subjective approach of the presumed intention of the parties has been 
criticised as being artificial.86 In the Laconian case,87 the appellant sought 
recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award against the respondent under the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards Act88 in the Durban High 
Court. Two procedural defences of res judicata and prescription under United States 
law, argued to be the proper law of the arbitral award, were raised.  
A charterparty had been prepared and stamped in New York by the 
respondent’s brokers, and was stamped in London by the respondent’s and 
appellant’s brokers. Payment was to have been made in US dollars to a London bank, 
                                                                                                                                     
82 The Supreme Court of Appeal replaced the Appellate Division from 1996 - Schedule 6 to the 
Constitution (n66). 
83 Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Efroiken & Newman 1924 AD 171. 
84 Efroiken (n83) at 185, own emphasis. 
85 Ibid at 195 and 196. 
86 Forsyth (n16) at 330; E Fredericks and J Neels ‘The Proper Law of a Documentary Letter of Credit 
(Part 1)’ (2003) 15 SA Merc LJ 63 at 66; C Forsyth ‘Enforcement of arbitral awards, choice of law in 
contract, characterization and a new attitude to private international law’ (1987) 104 SALJ 4 at 15. 
87 Laconian (n71). 
88 40 of 1977. 
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and the US Carriage of Goods Act was mentioned. An arbitration clause referred 
disputes to arbitration in London. When a dispute arose, the appellant referred it to 
arbitration with due notice to the respondent, but the respondent did not participate at 
all. The arbitrator found in favour of the appellant. 
The court looked at, first, the qualification of the relevant rule (namely, 
whether it is substantive or procedural) and, second, how the applicable law is 
determined. Booysen J appeared to take the view that the law of the lex fori must be 
applied to characterise the rule of law in question. Commentators have interpreted his 
reasoning to lend support to the enlightened lex fori or via media approach.89 
According to the court, the legal question under each potentially applicable system 
must be compared for a provisional characterisation. The final characterisation of the 
applicable law is based on the policy underlying the rule, consideration of 
international harmony and the need to promote uniformity of decisions.90  
 The court also considered the determination of the applicable law and, in an 
obiter statement, expressed its approval of the second theoretical approach .91 On this 
theory, the court determines what law has the closest and most real connection to the 
contract. Booysen J noted that the application of either the intention or the most real 
connection theories would lead to the same result92 but was bound to apply the 
intention theory endorsed by the higher authority of Efroiken given that the Laconian 
court was a provincial division.93  
In Improvair, another provincial division decision, the most real connection 
theory was again preferred. A contract was concluded between a South African and a 
French company. The parties neglected to select the applicable law. One of the issues 
in dispute was the governing law of the contract, specifically whether the proper law 
was French or South African law. This determination was crucial to the continued 
litigation: if French law applied, the action would cease and the parties would have to 
arbitrate according to French law. However, if South African law applied, they 
would not be required to arbitrate and the suit could continue. 
                                                
89 See Forsyth (n86) and J Neels ‘Falconbridge in Africa’ (2008) 4 Journal of Private International 
Law 167 at 183 and n96. 
90 Laconian (n71) at 518-519. 
91 This theory was endorsed in the case of Bonython v Commonwealth of Australia [1951] AC 201. 
92 Laconian (n71) at 527 and Improvair (Cape) (Pty) Ltd v Establissements Neu 1983 (2) SA 138 (C). 
93 The most real connection theory enquires which law has the closest connection to the contract, a 
more objective approach than that under the intention theory. 
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Grosskopf J pointed out the well known inherent difficulties in ascertaining the 
proper law of the contract, namely that ‘[t]he true problem arises where no express or 
tacit agreement was concluded’.94 
The court examined the earlier Efroiken decision that the proper law is that 
which the parties ought to have intended in the circumstances and observed that this 
was based on an outdated English approach which is no longer good law. The 
decision in Bonython was then referred to, in which the more modern determination 
of the proper law was set out – ascertaining which system has the closest and most 
real connection to the contract.95 
The contract in question was concluded in France, although this was not 
considered important. Far more significant was the fact that the contract was to have 
been performed in South Africa if certain joint tenders were accepted. The contract 
with which the court was concerned therefore purported to deal with the formalities 
of the joint venture and how work would be divided if their tenders were successful.  
The court also considered the balance of power between the parties and 
concluded that they needed each other equally in order to tender. This factor was not 
conclusive nor indicative of the proper law. The place of performance also yielded an 
innocuous result. 
The court concluded that, although the scales were fairly evenly balanced, they 
were tipped in favour of French law, which had the closest and most real connection 
to the contract as this was where operational decisions and joint administration of the 
joint venture was conducted.96 
Confirmation from the Constitutional Court or Supreme Court of Appeal on 
which theory applies in contemporary South African law would be welcomed.97 
Even if the proper law has been determined (either due to party choice or by 
ascertaining the most closely connected law), the court cannot ignore mandatory 
rules. These would include domestic mandatory rules of the proper law and 
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international mandatory rules.98 Eksi adds that, although domestic legislation holds 
many mandatory provisions, ‘not every imperative or mandatory rule in national law 
is accepted as directly applicable in the private international law sense.’99 
Mandatory rules must be applied unless their application would be unlawful or 
against public policy, gauged against the norms of the forum (South Africa). 100   
So-called international mandatory rules must be applied irrespective of the 
chosen law because they enhance economic, social and political aims of the enacting 
country.101 Although some such rules specifically state that they are to apply 
notwithstanding any contrary choice by the parties, this is not always the case. It then 
becomes a question of interpretation whether the rule was indeed intended to oust the 
chosen law, particularly whether the rule furthers public, rather than private, 
interests.102  Consumer protection legislation can be an example of furthering public 
interests and achieving economic, social and political aims. 
Although there is not an abundance of case law on this topic, our courts have 
had occasion to consider the application of mandatory rules. Certain categories have 
developed as a result. 
(i) Illegality under the proper law 
Where the proper law of the contract has been chosen by the parties, or 
determined by a court or tribunal, a contract that is illegal under that proper law will 
not be enforced.103 In the case of Herbst v Surti, the Zimbabwean High Court was 
called upon to determine whether an agreement of sale concluded contrary to the 
South African Group Areas Act was valid and enforceable in Zimbabwe. The proper 
law of the contract (that which had the closest and most real connection) was South 
African law.104  South Africa was also the place of performance. The court would not 
order performance of a contract that was unlawful in the country in which it was to 
                                                
98 De Villiers (n 11)  at 484.   
99 Eksi ‘The law applicable to consumer contracts under the EU Rome Convention’ (2005) TSAR 299 
at 308. 
100 Herbst v Surti 1991 (2) SA 75 (ZH). 
101 De Villiers (n 11) at 484; Roodt (n28) at 13; Spiro (n25) at 29. 
102 De Villiers (n 11) at 484. 
103 Forsyth (n16) at 344. 
104 It can be noted that the court reached its finding on the proper law after considering both the test 
enunciated in the Efroiken case (n83) (namely what ought the parties have intended to be the proper 
law of the contract) as well as the Bonython enquiry (which asks what law has the closest and most 
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have been performed, notwithstanding any moral disagreements the court had with 
the nature of the legislation under focus. 
Henry v Branfield105 concerned the sale of foreign currency (Zimbabwean 
dollars) in South Africa contrary to the South African Exchange Control Regulations. 
The Durban High Court held that the proper law of the contract was South African 
law, as the parties were resident in South Africa at the time the contract was 
concluded, the contract was concluded in South Africa and final payment was to 
have been made here. South African law had the closest and most real connection to 
the contract.  
The court referred to the dicta in the English Court of Appeal case of Ralli 
Brothers106 that an international contract remains valid to the extent that it is not 
illegal in the country of enforcement. This principle was found to have been based on 
public policy and comity, which extends to the economy of a friendly country. 
Accordingly, the contract was unenforceable, which would have had serious 
consequences for the exiled elderly Zimbabwean plaintiff. 
In Cargo Motor Corporation v Tofalos Transport107, several vehicles had been 
sold by a South African seller to a Zambian company. Delivery took place in South 
Africa but payment did not follow, and a settlement agreement was concluded in 
Johannesburg. Performance under that agreement was to take place there, too.  It was 
confirmed that the court will not enforce a contract if it is illegal in the place of 
performance.108 However, notwithstanding any potential contravention of the 
Zambian exchange control regulations, the settlement agreement was found to be 
valid and enforceable in South Africa. 
More recently, the Labour Court had occasion to consider the breach of an 
international employment contract.109 The court held that the parties had tacitly, 
alternatively impliedly, chosen South African law and the plaintiff’s claims were 
founded on mandatory laws of South Africa.  
The court stated that ‘[m]andatory or peremptory rules are based on social 
policy or are of a public policy nature, otherwise they are merely directory. A 
mandatory rule must be applied by the lex fori. Parties can choose the law to apply to 
                                                
105 1996 (1) SA 244 (D). 
106 Ralli Brothers v Compañia Naviera Sota y Aznar [1920] 2 KB 287 (CA) at 304, cited at 249. 
107 [1972] 1 All SA 106 (W). 
108 Ralli Brothers (n106); Kalher v Midland Bank Ltd [1950] AC 24. 
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a directory rule.’110 Although the court did not point this out, the distinction can be 
seen as consistent with the difference between non-derogable (‘peremptory’) rules 
and overriding (‘directory’) provisions. 
As such, the court held that the ‘complete codification’ by South African 
statutes of employment law meant that most of its rules were ‘mandatory, protective 
and of a public nature’ and applied to the contract.111 The court was guided by the 
Rome Convention, even though South Africa is not a party to it, and considered the 
primary question to be whether the employee was deprived of mandatory rules if 
foreign law was chosen to apply to an employment contract. It was acknowledged 
that it would be tough to argue otherwise given how extensive employment 
legislation is.112 The same could feasibly be submitted in the consumer context. 
To conclude, the court will interrogate the contract from the point of view of its 
proper law and will apply the mandatory rules of the proper law. 
(ii) Law of the forum 
In addition to the mandatory provisions of the proper law, under South African 
law, the mandatory rules of the lex fori apply in principle to the contract, 
notwithstanding a choice of law. These might operate to render the contract unlawful 
even it is lawful under its proper law.113   
The potential trumping by the lex fori of the chosen law is not a decision that 
should be taken lightly: it must be determined whether the statute is directly 
applicable. The intention of the legislation must clearly be to render contracts that are 
otherwise lawful under the choice of law unlawful by superseding the choice of 
law.114  
The Classic Sailing115 case analysed this issue in more detail. There, the 
Supreme Court of Appeal considered a dispute over alleged non-disclosures and 
misrepresentations relating to a yacht by the local insured respondent to its London-
based insurer, the appellant. The insurance contract contained a choice of law clause 
selecting English law and also provided that the South African courts would have 
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jurisdiction. The South African Short-term Insurance Act (the ‘South African 
Act’)116 contained provisions which conflicted with those of the English Act.  
The central question the court was required to determine was the allowable 
extent of party autonomy in choice of law clauses: could the parties exclude 
mandatory provisions of the lex fori (South African law)?  
The court accepted as its starting point that the law chosen by the parties is 
valid,  
‘[h]owever, legality is a question to be determined by the lex fori. This ius cogens 
(peremptory law) of the lex fori cannot be excluded… complete party autonomy cannot 
prevail over the peremptory provision of a statute, especially where the action is 
brought in terms of the statute…’117 
 
The court went on to find that the insurance of a vessel was expressly covered 
by the South African Act. This was motivated by the reasoning that the particular 
sections of that legislation were protective in nature – section 53 deals with non-
disclosures and misrepresentations made to insurers, whilst section 54 deals with a 
contravention of the law on a policy. These provisions were held to operate to the 
benefit of the unsophisticated, unwitting and uninformed insured, rather than leaving 
them at the mercy of unsympathetic insurers. Additional justification for the 
application of the South African Act was found in the provisions of the Admiralty 
Jurisdiction Regulation Act118 which effectively provided that, although parties are at 
liberty to select the applicable law, their choice cannot amount to an opting out of 
mandatory provisions of South Africa, the lex fori.119 
Accordingly, the protective provisions of the ius cogens (the South African 
Act) applied to the contract, and those aspects of the English Act which were 
inconsistent with its local counterpart did not apply.120 
This decision, although welcomed for confirming the principle that the ius 
cogens of the lex fori cannot be derogated from by agreement, has been subject to 
some critical comment. It has been argued that the parties in this specific case were 
not in unequal bargaining positions (as with some types of contracts, such as 
consumer and employment contracts). Rather, the insured was a shipping company – 
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certainly not a helpless individual insured without a working knowledge of the 
insurance and business world requiring the benefit of the legislative protections.121 
In sum, the mandatory rules of South Africa as the lex fori may apply with the 
effect that a contract lawful under its proper law can nonetheless be found to 
contravene the mandatory rules of the lex fori. 
(iii) Foreign legal systems 
There is a third category of mandatory provisions, in addition to those of the 
proper law and the lex fori: the provisions of a third legal system. The central and 
relevant enquiry is that pertaining to legality under the proper law or lex fori. 
Provided the contract is legal under these systems, the view is that the contract will, 
by and large, remain enforceable.122 Legal rules foreign to the lex fori and proper law 
are generally not applicable, even if their application would mean that the contract 
was unlawful. However, if a contract is unlawful under the lex solutionis or lex 
contractus, Forsyth’s view is that it would be against public policy of the lex fori to 
allow the courts to be used to enforce acts which are unlawful in the place of 
performance.123 This is consistent with the general approach of comity and respect 
for the sovereignty of nation states which underpins private international law;124 
however, it should be strictly applied. The ability of parties to regulate their 
expectations and prescribe the parameters of their respective obligations at the outset 
should be respected, and not overrun by legal provisions which may have a tenuous 
connection to the contract.125 
In conclusion, although it might appear that the mandatory provisions of the 
law of the place of performance do not override the proper law (where the proper law 
is foreign to that of the lex solutionis and lex fori), it may offend public policy of 
South Africa to enforce performance under that contract.126  
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 European Union  II
The central code regulating the proper law of a contract in the European Union 
is Rome I.127  One of the primary aims of Rome I is to reduce forum shopping in 
international contracts, which is possible under the related Regulation on Jurisdiction 
and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments (‘Brussels I’).128 This can be 
achieved if the courts which the parties choose to hear their dispute will apply the 
same rules, consistently, to deal with conflicts of law.129 
(a) Jurisdiction 
Brussels I applies to civil and commercial matters arising between parties 
domiciled in EU member states.130 Jurisdiction is generally exercised on the basis of 
the defendant’s domicile – nationality is not relevant to the enquiry.131 Article 2 
makes it clear that, in the absence of choice between parties, persons must be sued in 
the member state in which they are domiciled.132   
Some exceptions prevail.133 A defendant may in some instances be sued in the 
courts of the member state in which performance was due even if they are domiciled 
in another member state. An exclusive ground of jurisdiction may exist which will 
also override the general rule. For instance, if a claim relates to immovable property, 
the courts where the property is situated will have exclusive jurisdiction regardless of 
the domicile of the defendant (and plaintiff for that matter).134 One of the parties may 
also be entitled to greater procedural protection, such as in consumer disputes.  
Parties’ choice of court agreements will generally be respected by the court, 
and a chosen court will have exclusive jurisdiction unless otherwise agreed. 135  The 
choice cannot trump any existing rules on exclusive jurisdiction (for instance the 
exclusivity maintained by the courts in the member state where immovable property 
is situated).136 If neither (or none) of the contracting parties are domiciled in a 
member state, their respective national laws will determine jurisdiction. However, 
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none of the other member states are permitted to exercise jurisdiction in such an 
event unless and until the chosen court declines jurisdiction.137 
Unlike the situation under South African law, in the EU, there is no 
requirement that the international contract, dispute or parties be connected in any 
way with the chosen court or country.138  Conversely, and similar to South African 
law, the choice itself can be made either expressly (likely in a clause in a larger 
agreement regulating the parties’ obligations in a particular transaction) or tacitly, 
such as when a defendant files their appearance to defend without raising a 
preliminary complaint about the jurisdiction of the court.139 
There are, however, some types of contractual disputes in which one or more 
of the parties have traditionally been in a comparatively weaker position, and require 
greater protection.140  Consumer disputes are one such instance that may be subject 
to their own jurisdictional provisions in terms of articles 15, 16 and 17 of Rome I.141  
These articles provide that in consumer disputes (as defined) the consumer may only 
be sued in the courts of the member state in which the consumer is domiciled. The 
consumer has the option of instituting its own proceedings either in the courts in 
which the counter-party defendant is domiciled, or where the consumer itself is 
domiciled.142 
These ‘carve-outs’ apply where a consumer (being an individual acting outside 
of their trade or profession) concludes a contract for the sale of goods on credit 
instalments; or contracts on credit (repayable in instalments) which was extended to 
finance the sale of goods; or where the contract is concluded with a person who 
pursues their professional or business activities in the member state in which the 
consumer is domiciled, or otherwise directs their activities to that member state, and 
the particular contract is connected to those activities.143  These instances do not oust 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts concerning immovable property rights and 
insurance disputes, which are subject to their own provisions.144 
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The grounds upon which the parties can agree otherwise are strictly limited, 
and essentially they cannot agree to refer their disputes to the courts of a member or 
third state if this would prejudice the consumer.145 The consumer remains entitled to 
institute their claim where they reside, notwithstanding any agreement between the 
parties to the jurisdiction of a third state to avoid consumer protections. 
The purpose of these provisions is three-fold: Firstly, to protect the consumer 
(the presumed weaker party) from being sued in courts which are not their own, 
secondly, to allow the consumer the option of instituting action in their own country 
even if the defendant is domiciled in another member state and, thirdly, to prevent 
the circumvention of consumer protections under the applicable law.  
The real benefits of these provisions can be enjoyed when the consumer is 
domiciled in a member state.146 A consumer domiciled outside of a member state 
would only be entitled to the advantages afforded under the respective national 
jurisdictional laws, which may well require the consumer to sue the defendant in the 
country in which the defendant is domiciled. 
Once jurisdiction has been determined, the question of applicable law is 
resolved through the application of the provisions of Rome I.  
(b) Applicable law 
Courts in member states are required to apply the Rome I conflict rules to 
every legal system in the world, irrespective of whether that country is an EU 
member state and/or observes the same provisions.147 
Rome I respects party autonomy as a central tenet, subject to certain 
restrictions on weaker-party contracts and mandatory provisions. Accordingly, the 
proper law of the contract is that chosen by the parties (either expressly or implied 
from the contractual terms or surrounding circumstances such a reference to legal 
terms from a particular system of law) or the law which is the most closely 
connected. 
Similarly to South African law, the parties’ selection of a court or arbitration 
venue in a specific country does not automatically and exclusively indicate a choice 
of that country’s law as the proper law of the contract, but it may be one of a number 
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of factors supporting a tacit choice of law.148 However, if all other connecting factors 
point to one country, which is not the chosen law, the rules of that other country 
‘which cannot be derogated from by agreement’ (non-derogable mandatory law) will 
apply.149 
The parties are generally at liberty to choose any existing legal system, whether 
this is linked to or entirely separate from the contact. They are therefore free to select 
a system of law with which one or the other is wholly familiar, but also one with 
which they are equally unfamiliar (and therefore equally disadvantaged).150  As 
Stone explains, an ‘objective connection between the parties or the subject-matter of 
the dispute and the territory of the court chosen’ is not required.151   
That being said, the parties’ choice must not prejudice the application of any 
mandatory provisions of the only country to which the contract is connected (such as 
an entirely domestic French contract in which a less restrictive law is selected). The 
mandatory provisions of the chosen system must be applied, but not if they conflict 
with those of the system that would otherwise apply in the absence of their choice.152   
As under Brussels I, certain contracts153 enjoy the protection of explicit rules in 
their favour. In the case of consumers, article 6 provides that consumer contracts (as 
defined) are governed by the law of the country where the consumer is habitually 
resident. Consumer contracts are considered those concluded between an individual 
acting outside of their trade or profession and a person acting within the scope of 
their business or profession. The proper law presumption in favour of such a 
consumer will only operate to the extent that the other party (the ‘professional’) 
pursues or directs their business activities to the consumer’s country of habitual 
residence and the contract in question is within the context of these activities.154 If 
the contract was concluded ancillary to their main activities, or the 
business/professional did not direct their business to the consumer’s country of 
habitual residence, the consumer cannot rely on this presumption – the applicable 
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law would be determined in accordance with the categories set out in article 4.155 
This would be the case if, for instance, a French seller promotes and sells shoes 
exclusively in Germany, which are purchased by a Swiss visitor, who returns home 
to Switzerland only to find that the soles aren’t properly affixed. The laws of France 
would apply to deal with this dispute. 
In addition to protecting certain classes of contracting parties, Rome I gives 
prominence to mandatory provisions in articles 3 and 9. In Chapter One, the 
distinction between non-derogable and overriding mandatory rules was explained. It 
was also mentioned that article 3 of Rome I stipulates that the non-derogable laws of 
a wholly connected country will apply despite a choice to the contrary. In turn, 
Article 9 deals with the stricter category of overriding mandatory rules, which 
Kuipers considers to be ‘a special type of mandatory rules’ that apply regardless of 
the chosen law or objective connecting factor due to the nature of interests they seek 
to protect.156   
Article 9(1) states that 
‘Overriding mandatory provisions are… regarded as crucial by a country for 
safeguarding its public interests, such as its political, social or economic organisation, to 
such an extent that they are applicable to any situation falling within their scope, 
irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the contract under this Regulation.’  
 
In addition, the mandatory rules of the law of the forum will have the final say. 
As article 9(2) stipulates, ‘[n]othing in this regulation shall restrict the application of 
the overriding mandatory provisions of the law of the forum’.  
Finally, article 9(3) provides that the mandatory provisions of the law of the 
place of performance may be given effect to if these render performance under the 
contract unlawful. 
Three types of overriding mandatory rules are thus recognised under Rome I: 
those of the law governing the contract; those of the lex fori; and those of a third 
country (although this is a contentious issue). The respect paid to these mandatory 
rules is paramount, and they will, under Article 9, apply regardless of the law which 
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would otherwise apply under Rome I – the normal conflict rules are set aside and the 
overriding mandatory provisions are directly applicable.157   
Bogdan points out, however, that the provisions do not necessarily override 
other laws in all circumstances. Their precedence may be limited to situations which 
are significantly closely connected with their country. Nonetheless, they are intended 
to apply at least some of the time when the ordinary conflict rules point to another 
legal system.158 In this way, the parties’ attempts to ‘cleverly manipulat(e) the 
connecting factors or … simply (elect) a different law’159 are curtailed. This 
mechanism is arguably the most objective means by which the competing party 
interests and strengths may be fairly balanced.160 
The Ingmar case161 dealt with a commercial agent conducting operations in the 
United Kingdom for its California principal, under an agency agreement that referred 
disputes to California law. A dispute over commission payable after termination 
arose, and the ECJ held that the EU Directive on commercial agency agreements was 
designed to protect commercial agents, especially after termination of the contract. 
These provisions were held to be mandatory in nature,162 and applied to commercial 
agents carrying on their activity within the EU, regardless of the law which the 
parties chose to govern their relationship.163 
More recently, the ECJ considered whether wider protections established in the 
law of the forum trump minimum protections of the chosen law which were common 
to both laws.164 In that case, both Belgian and Bulgarian law complied with the EU 
Directive on commercial agency agreements, more specifically the compensation 
and/or indemnification that could be claimed by an agent on termination of their 
contract. Whilst the Bulgarian law transposed the minimum provisions of the 
Directive, the Belgian law established more extensive rights. 
When a dispute arose between a Belgian agent and their Bulgarian principal, 
the agent argued that it was entitled to the wider protection of Belgian law as it was 
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mandatory law.165 In turn, the Bulgarian agent argued that the parties had chosen 
Bulgarian law, which correctly applied the minimum standards of the Directive, and, 
in the interests of legal certainty and in accordance with the principle of freedom of 
contract, Bulgarian law should apply.166 
The ECJ noted that parties’ freedom of contract was a cornerstone of the Rome 
Convention167 and that therefore allegations of a ‘mandatory rule’ would have to be 
strictly interpreted. Guiding principles were formulated which can assist national 
courts in their assessment of whether the law that has been proposed to substitute the 
chosen law is indeed a mandatory rule. Courts should look at the exact terms of the 
alleged mandatory rule and the general structure of the law. Further, all 
circumstances in which the law was adopted should be considered to determine 
whether the law is mandatory in nature; specifically whether the legislature adopted 
the particular law to protect an interest that that country considered essential.168 
The court concluded that the mandatory provisions of the law of the forum 
which exceed the minimum protections common to both states and chosen by the 
parties can trump the chosen law, but only if it is found, after a detailed analysis, that 
the legislature of the forum was fundamentally required to legislate beyond the 
minimums established in the Directive in light of the nature and purpose of those 
provisions.169 
 Botswana III
Botswanan private international law is not codified, and its principles are 
buried in (predominantly) case law, international treaties and conventions, domestic 
statutes and academic writings.170 The approach is very closely aligned with the 
South African conflict of laws, and considerable reference is made, and reliance 
placed upon, South African case law as an authoritative source of law in 
Botswana.171 
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(a) Jurisdiction 
In Botswana, as in most countries, a jurisdictional link must exist between the 
court’s area of operation and the parties to the dispute and/or the dispute itself. Such 
a link could include the parties’ residence or domicile, place where the contract was 
concluded, submission to jurisdiction and the location of any immovable property.172 
Similar to the requirement in South African law, when the courts are dealing 
with a claim sounding in money, the question of jurisdiction depends on the status of 
the parties: whether they are incola or peregrinus of the court and the same 
determinative factors would apply.173  
In the case of Silverstone v Lobatse Clay Works174 the Botswana Appeal Court 
was called upon to determine whether a company incorporated in Botswana, with its 
registered head office in Botswana, was an incola of Botswana even though none of 
its shareholders were residents of the country, nor was the administration conducted 
in Botswana.  The court confirmed that, under Botswanan law (and relying on 
Roman Dutch Law as it has developed in South African jurisprudence) an incola is 
either domiciled or resident within the jurisdiction of a court, whether a natural or 
juristic person. In a decision aligned with the South African position,175 the court 
held that a company may be resident at its registered office, even if the central 
administration and control of the company is conducted elsewhere.176 
The earlier (South African) case of Njikelana177 can be relied upon as authority 
for the principle that, where jurisdiction has already been established based on 
domicile, attachment of property belonging to the defendant is not necessary. 
Conversely, where jurisdiction has been established based on a cause of action, 
attachment is necessary to confirm the jurisdictional link.178 
If, however, both the plaintiff and defendant are peregrini of the court, and the 
cause of action arose beyond the jurisdiction of the court, the court will not have 
jurisdiction and nor can it be established by attachment.179  
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Parties may try to avoid the mandatory protections of a jurisdiction by inserting 
a choice of forum clause referring any disputes under the agreement to a less 
protective jurisdiction, or one that would not apply the protections. However, as 
discussed above, and according to the South African authorities which would most 
likely be applicable, the consent cannot be vague, unconscionable, contrary to public 
policy or fraudulent.180 A consumer could thus still challenge the consent ostensibly 
ousting jurisdiction and therefore their access to mandatory protections. 
Only once jurisdiction has been established can the Botswanan courts begin to 
look at the question of applicable law.  
(b) Applicable law 
As has been mentioned above, Botswanan private international law is founded 
on many of the same principles of its South African counterpart, and many of the 
foundational concepts should therefore be familiar to South African lawyers.181 
Broadly speaking, every international contract has a proper, governing law 
which usually (but not exclusively) determines disputes arising out of the contract. 
The parties are ordinarily free to select the proper law, but if they do not, the system 
which has the closest and most real connection to the contract is the proper law.182 
Respect for party autonomy, a fundamental tenet of freedom of contract in 
Botswanan law, allows an express or implied choice. The South African authorities 
cited in support of these conflict cornerstone principles confirm that party autonomy 
must be supported,183 whilst case law on the early ‘ticket cases’ reiterates that a 
choice can be implicitly made and evidenced by factors such as the place of 
conclusion of the contract, the nationalities of the parties and the place of payment.184 
In the event that the parties make no choice, whether express or implied, the 
proper law of the contract must be assigned. ‘[T]he general rule (is)…that the rights 
of parties to the contract are to be judged by the laws of that country by which they 
intend to bind themselves or rather by which they may be justly presumed to have 
bound themselves.’185 
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The South African authorities on determination of applicable law should be 
followed by the Botswanan courts, in the absence of clear Botswanan precedent. The 
Cape case of Improvair186 (detailed above in the discussion of applicable law in 
South Africa) is considered authority for the determination of the proper law of a 
contract in the absence of choice, and the preferred means is the most real connection 
test.  
As regards mandatory rules, certain principles are pertinent. Firstly, the 
mandatory rules of the proper law cannot be avoided or ousted by a choice of law. In 
addition, the mandatory rules of the lex fori will apply, despite a choice of law to the 
contrary, as they relate to consumers. Finally, although the mandatory rules of a third 
country may not appear relevant, they may be indirectly applicable to the extent that 
Botswanan public policy would be violated if performance was enforced under the 
contract.187 
 International commercial arbitration IV
(a) Jurisdiction 
Party autonomy is paramount to whether the arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction to 
adjudicate the dispute or not.188 Agreement to arbitrate is essential, and the parties’ 
ability to regulate, by agreement, the procedure and applicable law is limited only by 
public policy or any rules which may apply to the arbitration due to their choice.189 
(b) Applicable law 
Provided the arbitration agreement is valid, the tribunal appointed in terms of 
that agreement is empowered to adjudicate the dispute within the bounds of their 
referral. The validity, effect and interpretation of the arbitration agreement itself is 
governed by the proper law of that agreement.190 
In determining the applicable law, the arbitrator must in the first instance have 
respect for the parties’ choice and in its absence, the proper law must be assigned. In 
so doing, the arbitrator is not subject to the same conflict rules that restrict a national 
court. Under the ICC arbitration rules, parties are free to agree to rules to be applied 
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that must be applied to the merits of their dispute. But if there is no agreement, the 
arbitrator must apply the rules of law ‘which it determines to be appropriate’.191 
 Ultimately, the arbitrator must determine the law that has the closest and most 
real connection to the agreement. Many factors may be considered to establish a 
sufficient connection, such as the place of conclusion, the place of performance, the 
nationality or domicile of the parties, any customs or trade practices, or even the 
general principles of the lex mercatoria including the UNIDROIT principles.192  
Mandatory rules may apply at arbitration in the same way as they would in 
court. Whilst national courts are considered bound to refuse to enforce an arbitration 
agreement, or refuse to recognise and enforce an arbitral award, due to the public 
policy of the forum, the same may not be said for an arbitrator or tribunal presiding 
over an international arbitration. According to Bermann, an arbitrator ‘would seem to 
be free of the public policy constraints of any state’.193 An arbitrator remains, 
however, subject to the reality that an award which ignores mandatory provisions 
may not be recognised and enforced for being contrary to public policy.194 
There appears to be consensus amongst courts and commentators that, at the 
very least, an arbitral tribunal must apply the mandatory rules of arbitral procedure of 
the forum. These mandatory rules regulate the validity of the proceedings and permit 
the issuance of a valid award that is enforceable in that forum.195 
If the law of the forum is also the applicable law, it is clear that the mandatory 
substantive rules of the forum would also apply. However, if the proper law is that of 
a foreign country, it is less clear whether the mandatory rules of the forum would 
continue to apply. It has been argued196 that only those norms governed by the law of 
the forum would apply (the ‘ordre public interne’ as categorised in French law) 
rather than any outside, international norms (‘ordre public international’). Certainly, 
the tribunal would need to ensure that the particular rules were intended to apply to 
the situation at hand, a determination which can necessarily only be made on a case 
by case basis. 
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The position is much clearer in the case of mandatory rules of the chosen law: 
these should be applied, unless they are not relevant to the dispute or if their 
application would offend other mandatory rules or norms. Such other mandatory 
rules or norms could include those of the forum.197 
The potential application of mandatory rules of a third country could also arise 
at an international arbitration. Like a judge, an arbitral tribunal could be faced with 
the dilemma of whether or not to apply mandatory norms of a country that is neither 
the chosen law nor the law of the forum.198 This is a vexed question with no clear 
answer. 
Unlike judges, an arbitrator is generally free from the bounds of conflict rules 
of the jurisdiction and therefore enjoys much greater flexibility than their judicial 
counterparts. Arbitrators are thus, in theory at least, at liberty to apply the rules of a 
third country where appropriate.199 
Various guiding criteria have been suggested to enable rational and reasonable 
inclusion of third country mandatory rules: the existence and strength of the 
particular country’s link to the dispute; the tribunal’s view on the value of applying 
the rule(s); and whether the outcome of such application would be appropriate.200 
Despite these proposals, it would seem clear that the actual application of mandatory 
rules and norms of a third country would be the exception rather than the rule.201 
In the United States’ Supreme Court case of Mitsubishi, the court assumed that 
an arbitral tribunal in Japan would read the arbitration clause widely enough to 
include claims under United States competition/anti-trust law, despite the parties’ 
intention for Swiss law to apply to disputes. Their choice was narrowly interpreted to 
be limited to contractual claims only.202 
The mandatory rules of a third country could also become relevant and 
appropriately applied if the tribunal is aware at the outset that enforcement of any 
award would be sought in that specific country.203 It would be nonsensical and 
contrary to the interests of justice to ignore its mandatory rules or public policy 
norms in such a situation. 
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Lastly, the mandatory rules of a third country may be considered in a ‘blended’ 
application of laws. As Bermann suggests, the tribunal could accept that, in terms of 
the parties’ chosen law, illegality is a defence to claims for performance under the 
contract, but then look to the laws of the place of performance for the content of what 
constitutes illegality.204 
To conclude this subsection, it may be remarked that, in the absence of choice, 
the tribunal must apply the law it deems the most appropriate. Part of this should 
include the freedom to seek and apply mandatory rules from a variety of nations, 
whether these seem directly relevant (in the case of the proper law or law of the 
forum) or even indirectly so (such as those of a third country with a less obvious link 
to the dispute). Where the parties have chosen the proper law, the freedom of the 
tribunal to apply mandatory rules from other systems is more curtailed out of respect 
for party autonomy. However, as discussed above, this does not exclude the 
application of mandatory rules from other systems even if they do not appear to be 
pertinent at first glance. 205 This can be to the benefit of weaker parties at arbitration 
who might initially seem to have agreed to that mandatory protective mechanisms do 
not apply – there remains room to argue otherwise. 
CHAPTER 4 : BACKGROUND TO THE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 
 
This chapter will consider the need for the rights based approach of the CPA through 
an examination of the purpose of this legislation, together with a discussion of the 
legislative drafting process itself. This will incorporate reference to the inspiration 
the legislature drew from different jurisdictions and the general trends in consumer 
protection which may be distilled from some of these countries. The countries 
included Argentina, Brazil, Chile, India, the United Kingdom, Finland, Botswana, 
Malawi, Uganda and Canada; but only India, the European Union, Canada and 
Botswana are discussed.206 
                                                
204 Bermann (n42) at 335. 
205 Ibid at 339. 
206 Memorandum (n 7). 
35 
 Need for consolidated and bespoke consumer protection legislation in I
South Africa  
Until the CPA was promulgated, South African consumer (and related) rights 
enjoyed protection under a disparate legal framework which dealt with elements of 
what could be considered consumer rights: there was no consolidated, single body of 
law which dealt with a designated group of defined consumers and consumer 
transactions.207 The Memorandum on the Objects of the Consumer Protection Bill 
cites that, although consumers were protected to a degree under these provisions, 
they were outdated and incidental rather than central to consumer protection.208 
Consumers were entitled to the respect of certain fundamental rights under 
legislation including the National Credit Act (‘the NCA’),209 the Electronic 
Communications and Transactions Act (‘the ECTA’),210 the Competition Act,211 the 
Companies Act,212 the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 
(‘FAIS’),213 the Standards Acts,214 the Foodstuffs, Cosmetics and Disinfectants 
Act215 and the Rental Housing Act216 and their respective regulations to name but a 
few. The common law, of course, was also applicable. 
One of the obvious consequences of this fragmented approach was that 
consumers were not aware of and did not have a full appreciation for their 
unconsolidated rights. This was not a phenomenon unique to South Africa. 
According to Van Eeden, following World War II there was an international focus on 
consumer rights and relationships with big business. It became clear to scholars that 
fundamental disparities between business and the end user, where consumers were 
unfairly treated and exposed to dangerous or poor quality products, were allowed to 
perpetuate. Furthermore, consumers had little opportunity for redress – their pockets 
were often simply not deep enough to propel their complaints through the courts.217 
However, as the world steamed towards industrialisation, so too did consumer rights 
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experience an overhaul. The individual consumer came to be recognised as 
representative of ‘the consumer interest’ with a ‘distinct and identifiable role and 
interest in society’.218 
In addition to the disjointed approach to consumer rights in South Africa, some 
industries over-regulated (the banking and insurance industries are arguably two of 
the most regulated in our society), whilst others were not properly regulated nor 
policed (the residential housing market in particular relies heavily on self-regulation 
to ensure that the rights of tenants are not trampled upon). The opportunity for abuse 
and misuse of the law was often too tempting.219  
As a result, and as a primary purpose, the CPA endeavours to ‘promote and 
advance the social and economic welfare of consumers’.220 It intends to achieve this 
ideal through a multi-faceted approach221 founding a legal framework to establish a 
fair, accessible, efficient and sustainable consumer market; reducing the difficulties 
experienced by low income households, rural communities and marginalised 
people222 in accessing quality goods and services; encouraging fair business 
practices; enhancing consumer education and information which will bolster 
consumer responsibility; and providing for an efficient dispute resolution system.223 
With an overwhelming focus on the rights of consumers, the CPA has been 
criticised for not considering the position of suppliers with more understanding. De 
Stadler considers this ‘regrettable’224 and cautions that small to medium enterprises 
will bear the brunt of this oversight, as their ability to compete in the market may 
struggle to balance with that of their larger competitors.225 
Ultimately, however, the drafters of the CPA must be lauded for merging into 
one cohesive Act (and its accompanying regulations) the results of decades of 
research, debate and study from across the globe. The market has been overhauled 
and clear legislative provisions now apply to unfairness in contracts, product liability 
and sales of goods and services. Perhaps most significant is the task placed at the 
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door of the courts.226 When interpreting the CPA, a court must promote the spirit and 
purposes of the Act and make appropriate, practical orders to advance, protect and 
promote the fulfilment of the rights embodied in the CPA.227 The common law, too, 
must be developed in order that consumer rights may be fully realised.228 
 Comparison with other jurisdictions: who is entitled to protection?  II
Generally speaking, the people entitled to protection under the classification of 
‘consumers’ is defined quite widely across the globe. The definition of ‘consumer’ is 
central and can include both natural and juristic persons entering into transactions for 
consideration or otherwise (with ‘consideration’ being narrowly or widely defined), 
and may also extend to third parties who were not privy to the initial transaction 
between a supplier (as defined) and a consumer. 
Some jurisdictions, however, restrict the definition of ‘consumer’ with the 
effect that the protections characteristic of consumer legislation may be limited to 
natural persons acquiring goods or hiring services for private purposes. There is 
almost universal acceptance that consumer protection legislation does not apply to 
protect consumers in transactions of a strictly business nature, although this is not 
always the case, 229 and is not the case in South African law.  
Similarly, the definitions of ‘supplier’, ‘trader’, ‘distributor’ and 
‘manufacturer’ can widen or restrict the scope of consumer protections. 
These general introductory observations are now expanded upon with reference 
to specific jurisdictions. 
(a) India 
The Indian Consumer Protection Act of 1986 adopts a wordy definition of 
‘consumer’, highlighting the difficulty with defining consumers as a group. A person 
will only qualify as a consumer if consideration has been paid, deferred or promised, 
or partly paid or promised, for the purchase of any goods or the hire of any services. 
The definition includes not only the person who purchased or hired the particular 
goods or services but also any third party user or beneficiary of such goods or 
services. However, any user or beneficiary using the goods or services for their own 
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commercial purposes (for instance to on-sell or sub-lease) is excluded from the 
definition, and therefore the protections of the legislation.230 
Manufacturers and traders are separately defined, a significance relevant to the 
liability provisions. The definition of ‘manufacturer’ is wide enough to include any 
person who makes the goods or parts; assembles goods and claims the end product as 
their own; or puts their own mark in the goods and claims their manufacture. 
‘Trader’ is broadly defined to extend to any person who sells, distributes (including 
the manufacture) or packages goods.231 
(b) European Union 
Consumer protection legislation in the European Union takes the form of 
multiple Directives issued for specific instances directly relevant to consumers. For 
example, there are specific Directives dealing with Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts232, Contracts Negotiated Away From Business Premises233, Package 
Travel, Package Holidays and Package Tours234 and General Product Safety235. Each 
of these Directives define consumers, suppliers and producers independently: there is 
no single definition that features throughout. Rather, the definitions of the relevant 
role-players are tailored for the specific conduct or situation the particular Directive 
seeks to regulate.236  
The most general definition of ‘consumer’ seems to be found in the Directive 
dealing with unfair contractual terms. This considers a consumer to be a natural 
person acting outside of their trade, business or profession. A similar version is 
included in the Directive regulating contracts concluded away from business 
premises. 
Protection is extended to third parties in package holiday deals under the 
package holiday Directive – this is not limited strictly to the individuals who 
purchased the package in question. Holidaymakers who had their packages bought 
on their behalf, or transferred to them, are also entitled to protection.  
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‘Producers’ are defined in the Directive dealing with product liability for 
defective products to include manufacturers of raw materials, products or their 
components, any person representing that they are a producer, or anyone importing 
products into the community. If the producer cannot be identified, the supplier is 
presumed to be the producer. A ‘supplier’ is generally defined to be persons (natural 
or juristic) who deal with consumers in a trade or professional context. 
(c) Canada 
The definition of ‘consumer’ under the Ontario Consumer Protection Act, 
2002, is arguably the most restrictive. In section 1, a consumer is simply defined as 
‘…an individual acting for personal, family or household purposes’ which excludes 
by implication juristic persons, even small businesses, and any business transactions 
within or above any prescribed monetary thresholds. The onus will be on the 
consumer to establish that their conduct was for personal, family or household 
purposes only. Although this definition limits the potential pool of consumers, it is 
easily understandable and abundantly obvious who a consumer is and in what 
instances. 
A definition of ‘manufacturer’ is absent, but a ‘supplier’ is widely defined to be 
a person whose business it is to sell, lease or trade in goods and services, including 
their agents or any person purporting to be a supplier or a supplier’s agent.237 
(d) Botswana 
Section 2 of Botswana’s Consumer Protection Act 1998 provides that a 
consumer is a person who does not transact for business purposes (some of which 
purposes are specifically listed). A ‘consumer’ is any person or non-profit 
organisation who is offered or supplied foods or services (a ‘commodity’, including 
investments) who does not intend to use the goods for on-sale, re-hire or manufacture 
for gain. 
Suppliers are not defined but a ‘business’ is considered to offer, supply or 
make available commodities or services for consideration, or solicit and receive any 
investment. 
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(e) Conclusion 
These definitions are fundamental when determining who is entitled to 
consumer protection and in what circumstances.  
CHAPTER 5 : RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE CONSUMER 
PROTECTION ACT 
 
The application and scope of the CPA will be considered, following a discussion of 
the primary rights the CPA seeks to promote. 
 Foundation rights I
The CPA is founded on ten cornerstone rights which guide the fulfilment of its 
‘core purpose… [which is] to promote and advance the social and economic welfare 
of consumers in South Africa’.238 These rights are highlighted together with a brief 
overview of the legislative means by which these may be realised. 
The right to equal access to the consumer market is based on the right not to be 
unfairly discriminated against as set out in the Constitution239 and the Promotion of 
Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act.240 Accordingly, provision is 
made to avert (and in some instances prohibit) unfair discrimination between 
suppliers and consumers, and to promote consumers’ access to goods and services, as 
well as the availability, quality and pricing of such goods and services.241 
The consumer’s right to privacy is also based on a fundamental right in the Bill 
of Rights.242 In the context of consumer transactions, the relevant provisions are 
primarily aimed at curbing unsolicited direct marketing, and regulating the time and 
place of such activities.243  
The consumer’s right to choose is given prominence in the CPA. Consumers 
are entitled to select goods after examination and comparison of price. ‘Bundling’ of 
products is specifically prohibited unless there is an economic advantage for the 
consumer (i.e. the ‘bundled’ goods are cheaper than if they were sold individually). 
Fixed term agreements entered into after the commencement of the CPA are also 
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strictly regulated, and consumers now have the right to cancel fixed term agreements 
(as defined) subject to certain limits and reasonable charges. Further, maintenance or 
repairs may only take place with the consumer’s prior approval. Linked to the 
limitations on direct marketing, a five day cooling off period will apply to any direct 
marketing sales.244 
In terms of the right to disclosure and information, consumers must be able to 
understand the terms and conditions of the agreements they conclude, and the 
services and merchandise they use and consume. Such an informed choice requires 
prices to be displayed, accurate trade descriptions of goods, sales receipts, disclosure 
of commissions,245 suitable identification of work and delivery people, and plain, 
understandable language in printed material (such as advertisements and 
contracts).246 
Consumers are also entitled to receive fair and responsible marketing, which 
right includes a general prohibition against misleading, fraudulent or deceptive 
marketing. As will likely have become apparent, much stricter rules now apply to 
direct marketing initiatives, and promotional competitions (which previously fell 
under the Lotteries Act247) are governed by the CPA to ensure that the competitions 
and prizes are appropriately run.248 
The CPA further prohibits any unfair, forceful or unconscionable conduct 
throughout a transaction – from marketing, to supply of goods or performance of 
services, to the recovery of goods from consumers.249 
Unfair, unjust and unreasonable contractual terms and conditions are prohibited 
under the Act and its regulations. Any limitations of liability on the part of the 
supplier must clearly be drawn to the attention of the consumer, and certain 
agreements or clauses are rendered void ab initio.250 This would apply to cross-
border trade in the consumer’s favour.  
To advance the right to fair value, good quality and safety, the CPA establishes 
a regime of liability irrespective of negligent conduct in the realm of product 
liability. Consumers have a general right to receive goods that are of good quality 
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and free from defects, unless they have expressly agreed to purchase goods in a 
disclosed condition. In addition to any other liability (which may accrue under the 
common law or other legislation), section 61 provides that any producer, distributor 
or supplier (as defined) is strictly liable for any harm caused, wholly or partially, due 
to a product defect or failure, subject to certain exceptions. Such harm includes 
death, disability, injury, illness and loss and/or damage to property.251 The extent of 
this potential liability in the conflict of laws realm is examined in further detail in 
Chapter Six below. 
Linked to the consumer’s right to fair value, good quality and safety is the 
supplier’s accountability to consumers. Suppliers are responsible for any deposits 
paid, and must honour vouchers and credits for up to five years after they are issued 
(a departure from common practice by suppliers to limit the opportunity to redeem 
vouchers for a far shorter period, not to mention the ‘standard’ prescription period of 
three years)252.253 
These rights would remain empty promises without the consumer’s right to be 
heard and obtain redress. The Consumer Commission has therefore been established 
to deal with consumer complaints and violations of consumer rights.254 The efficacy 
of this Commission has, however, been hamstrung by various constraints, not least of 
which have related to budget limitations and personnel issues since inception. As a 
result, the Commission has not (yet) had as much of an impact as it may otherwise 
have had on changing conduct in the market.  
 Application and scope of the CPA  II
Section 5 of the CPA defines the scope of the Act. The Act will apply to every 
transaction occurring in South Africa (whether or not the supplier is based in the 
country), the advertising, marketing and selling of goods and services by suppliers 
(who are not excluded), and transactions where the supplier does not make a profit, 
provided the transaction is not excluded.255 
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‘5 Application of Act 
 
1. This Act applies to –  
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a) every transaction occurring within the Republic, unless it is exempted 
by subsection (2), or in terms of subsections (3) and (4); 
b) the promotion of any goods or services, or the supplier of any goods or 
services, within the Republic, unless –  
a) those goods or services could not reasonably be the subject of a 
transaction to which this Act applies in terms of paragraph (a); or 
b) the promotion of those goods or services has been exempted in 
terms of subsections (3) and (4). 
c) goods or services that are supplied or performed in terms of a transaction to 
which this Act applies, irrespective of whether any of those goods or services are 
offered or supplied in conjunction with any other goods or services, or separate 
from any other goods or services; and 
d) goods that are supplied in terms of a transaction that is exempt from the 
application of this Act, but only to the extent provided for in subsection (5). 
2. This Act does not apply to any transaction –  
a) in terms of which goods or services are promoted or supplied to the State; 
b) in terms of which the consumer is a juristic person whose asset value or 
annual turnover, at the time of the transaction, equals or exceeds the threshold 
value determined by the Minister in terms of section 6; 
c) if the transaction falls within an exemption granted by the Minister in terms 
of subsections (3) and (4); 
d) that constitutes a credit agreement under the National Credit Act, but the 
goods or services that are the subject of the credit agreement are not excluded 
from the ambit of this Act; 
e) pertaining to services to be supplied under an employment contract; 
f) giving effect to a collective bargaining agreement within the meaning of 
section 23 of the Constitution and the Labour Relations Act, 1995 (Act 66 of 
1995); or 
g) giving effect to a collective agreement as defined in section 213 of the 
Labour Relations Act, 1995 (Act 66 of 1995). 
3. A regulatory authority may apply to the Minister for an industry-wide exemption 
from one or more provisions of this Act on the grounds that those provisions overlap or 
duplicate a regulatory scheme administered by that regulatory authority in terms of – … 
a) Any other national legislation; or 
b) Any treaty, international law, convention or protocol. 
4. … 
5. If any goods are supplied within the Republic to any person in terms of a 
transaction that is exempt from the application of this Act, those goods, and the importer 
or producer, distributor and retailer of those goods, respectively, are nevertheless subject 
to sections 60 and 61. 
6. For greater certainty, the following arrangements must be regarded as a transaction 
between a supplier and a consumer, within the meaning of this Act: 
a) the supply of any goods or services in the ordinary course of business to 
any of its members by a club, trade union, association, society or other 
collectivity, whether corporate or unincorporated, of persons voluntarily 
associated and organised for a common purpose or purposes, whether for fair 
value consideration or otherwise, irrespective of whether there is a charge or 
economic contribution demanded or expected in order to become or remain a 
member of that entity; 
b) a solicitation of offers to enter into a franchise agreement; 
c) an offer by a potential franchisor to enter into a franchise agreement with a 
potential franchisee; 
d) a franchise agreement or an agreement supplementary to a franchise 
agreement; and 
e) the supply of any goods or services to a franchisee in terms of a franchise 
agreement. 
7. The application of this Act in terms of subsections (1) to (7) extends to a matter 
irrespective of whether the supplier –  
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The Act does not apply to transactions where goods and services are promoted 
or supplied to the State; transactions involving a consumer that is a juristic person 
with an asset value or annual turnover falling above the threshold determined by the 
Minister;256 transactions that are exempt in terms of section 5(3) and (4); transactions 
giving effect to collective bargaining agreements257 or collective agreements;258 the 
provision of any education, information, advice or consultation regulated by FAIS; 
any banking or related services including advice under FAIS or the Long- and Short-
term Insurance Acts;259 and any employment agreements. 
The definitions of certain key terms require consideration. Fundamentally, a 
‘transaction’ that is subject to the provisions of the CPA is defined to mean an 
agreement between a supplier acting in the ordinary course of business with a 
consumer for the supply or goods or services for consideration, including franchise 
agreements. 
A ‘consumer’ is a person to whom goods and services are marketed, or a 
person who contracts with a supplier, in the ordinary course of the supplier’s 
business and any users or beneficiaries of those goods or services regardless of 
whether they were a party to the initial transaction, unless the transaction has been 
specifically exempted. A franchisee under a franchise agreement (as contemplated 
under the CPA) is also included in the definition of consumer.260 
The definition of ‘supplier’ is not as clearly stated in the Act. A ‘supplier’ is 
defined to mean ‘a person who markets any goods or services’; the definition of 
‘market’ means the promotion or supply of any goods or services; whilst ‘promote’ 
means to advertise, display or offer goods or services in the ordinary course of 
                                                                                                                                     
a) resides or has its principal office within or outside the Republic; 
b) operates on a for-profit basis or otherwise; or 
c) is an individual, juristic person, partnership, trust, organ of state, an entity 
owned or directed by an organ of state, a person contracted or licensed by an 
organ of state to offer or supply any goods or services, or is a public-private 
partnership; or 
d) is required or licensed in terms of any public regulation to make the supply 
of the particular goods or services available to all or part of the public. (emphasis 
supplied)’ 
 
256 In terms of section 6 of the Act. The threshold is currently determined at R2 million – Government 
Gazette no. 34181, 1 April 2011 
257 As defined in terms of section 23 of the Constitution (n66) and the Labour Relations Act, 66 of 
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259 Acts 52 and 53 of 1998 respectively. 
260 Section 1. 
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business to the public for consideration or representations or inducements to that 
effect.261 
A ‘distributor’ of goods is a person who, in the ordinary course of business, is 
supplied with goods by a producer, importer or another distributor and on-supplies 
the goods either to another distributor or to a retailer.262   
Particularly relevant to cross-border trade, an ‘importer’ is considered to be any 
person who brings goods (or causes them to be brought) from outside South Africa 
into the country with the intention to supply the goods in the ordinary course of 
business.263 
‘Goods’ are extremely widely defined. They include anything marketed for 
human consumption, other tangible objects (including written or encodeable media 
such as compact discs), literature, music, films, data, photographs or other intangible 
products that have been written or coded as well as any related licence, a legal 
interest in land or other immovable property beyond that which is considered a 
‘service’ (as defined), gas, water and electricity.264  
The definition of ‘service’ is similarly broad. It includes any work done for the 
benefit of another person, the provision of any advice or information (other than that 
regulated by FAIS), and any banking or financial services that are not otherwise 
regulated under named legislation.265 The definition also includes transportation of 
people or goods, the provision of accommodation, sustenance, entertainment, 
electronic communication infrastructure, access to an event or facility, access to and 
use of rented premises, and the rights of a franchisee under a franchise agreement.266 
The Act will thus generally apply only in instances where the defined criteria 
set in terms of section 5 are met. However, as is provided for under section 5(5), the 
provisions regulating safety monitoring and recall, and liability for damage caused 
by goods (product liability)267 will apply to the supply of any goods within South 
Africa to any person in a transaction (whether or not that transaction is exempt) and 
                                                





265 FAIS (n213), the Long-term Insurance Act (n259) or the Short-term Insurance Act (n116). The 
insurance industry was in terms of Schedule 2, sub-item 10, given 18 months to align its regulatory 
framework with the protections of the Act. 
266 Section 1. 
267 Sections 60 and 61 respectively. 
46 
importers, distributors and retailers of the goods may therefore attract the 
concomitant liability in circumstances where the Act would otherwise not apply. 
The following simple example illustrates the effect of this provision: if a 
government department purchases a product, the transaction would not normally be 
subject to the Act as the state is specifically excluded as a consumer from the 
benefits of the Act. However, section 5(5) read with section 61 extends the 
application of the Act to instances where consumer safety is impacted, regardless of 
the identity of that consumer. The state would, in these circumstances only, be 
entitled to the protections the Act offers consumers. A more detailed scenario will be 
proferred in Chapter Six. 
Section 5 does not spell out what constitutes a ‘transaction occurring in [South 
Africa]’.268 Precisely what is meant by ‘occur’ is unclear and neither does the 
definitions clause provide any clarity on this requirement. This has unfortunate 
consequences for international trade, which desires certainty in an increasingly 
uncertain and volatile market place. According to the Oxford Dictionary,269 ‘occur’ 
means ‘happen; take place’. On this understanding, one or more elements of the 
transaction must take place within the country in order for the CPA to be applicable: 
the contract should be concluded here, the goods should be produced or delivered 
here, or even payment of the contract price should be made into a South African 
bank account for there to be a possibility of the Act applying. Where there is no 
tenable link between the transaction and South Africa, it would seem abundantly 
clear that the Act will not apply (in the absence of any choice of law provision 
appointing South African law, or in the absence of the jurisdiction of the South 
African courts).  
It is appropriate to briefly mention that, in order to resolve exclusively CPA-
related disputes, certain preliminary steps must be taken.  The Act does not abolish 
existing common-law rights, and if only a common law right is affected (such right 
not being in the CPA), the consumer may proceed directly to court in the usual 
manner. The situation is slightly more complicated when the consumer has both 
common law and CPA rights: they may still rely on their common law rights and 
approach the court for relief in terms of the common law, but the enforcement 
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procedures set out in the Act must first be followed to prosecute their CPA rights. 
This requires the exhaustion of all other remedies (namely the referral of the 
complaint for investigation by the Consumer Commission, any industry ombud or 
directly to the Consumer Tribunal). Only once all the consumer’s other options have 
been exercised may a court with jurisdiction be approached.270 To that end, the Act 
specifically requires persons who have suffered loss or damage due to prohibited or 
non-compliant conduct, and who have civil damages claims, to also file at that court 
a notice from the Consumer Tribunal detailing its findings –  specifically, whether 
the conduct was found to be prohibited or required by the Act.271 
The court is empowered to declare that a transaction was unconscionable, 
unjust, unreasonable or unfair, and may order that money or property be returned to 
the consumer; compensation for losses or expenses relating to the agreement and the 
litigation; or requiring the supplier to cease or alter any practice, form or document to 
prevent recurrent conduct, as the case may be.272 
CHAPTER 6 : WHEN AND HOW WOULD THE CONSUMER 
PROTECTION ACT POTENTIALLY BECOME MANDATORY IN 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL TRADE? 
 
This chapter will deal with when and how the CPA might be considered 
mandatory through the use of three practical examples to illustrate the inter-play 
between the provisions of the Act and everyday commercial life: an ordinary B2C273 
transaction; a franchise agreement;274 and a ‘big business’ (falling above the 
Ministerial threshold) in a product liability scenario under section 61. 
Recommendations will also be offered as to how this question should be resolved by 
national courts and commercial arbitration fora. Last, the question of the recognition 
and enforcement in South Africa of a foreign judgment granted without consideration 
of the CPA will be considered. 
It may be mentioned that once it has been determined that the CPA is 
mandatory and must be applied to the particular transaction, a further question arises 
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as to whether it is possible to avoid some of the particular provisions within the Act 
itself. Certainly, various protections and rights are non-derogable. Part G of the 
Act275 for instance canvasses prohibited and unfair, unreasonable and unjust contract 
terms and agreements, read together with the regulations to the Act.276 It is, however, 
possible to vary some of the Act’s provisions. For example, although section 55(2)(a) 
and (b) provide for the consumer’s right to safe, quality goods, section 55(6) allows 
this standard to be avoided, but only if the consumer is expressly told of the goods’ 
condition and has expressly agreed to accept the goods in that condition. Full 
consideration of this question is beyond the scope of this paper and will not be 
discussed further. 
 When might the CPA apply as mandatory law?  I
Cross-border commercial transactions take place on a virtually continuous 
basis. Many of these may be linked directly or indirectly to South Africa through the 
residence or place of business of the parties, the place of contracting or performance 
or even the place of production of the goods themselves. The goods may also be put 
to use in South Africa, after purchase and modification outside of the country. 
Chapter Three explained that mandatory rules of the proper law of the 
contract will apply, and in the employment context it was shown that most of the 
rules of South African employment law are ‘mandatory, protective and of a public 
nature.’277 In addition, the mandatory rules of the forum must apply particularly 
where legislation is protective in nature. Lastly, enforcement of a contract that is 
legal in the place of performance may nonetheless offend mandatory provisions of 
the lex fori due to its public policy.278 
The difficulty is that the Act itself does not expressly state whether it is 
mandatory law at all, let alone the distinction between non-derogable or overriding 
mandatory law. Under the NCA and ECTA, the position is clear. The NCA provides 
that any contractual provisions, including requiring a consumer to waive a right or 
agreeing to limit the supplier’s liability, are void or voidable.279 The ECTA states 
that its protections ‘appl[y] irrespective of the legal system applicable to the 
                                                
275 Sections 48-52. 
276 Specifically subregulation 44 of The Regulations in terms of the CPA (n 1). 
277 Parry v Astral Operations (n109) at 59. 
278 See Chapter Three, pages 17-21.  
279 Section 55 NCA (n209). 
49 
agreement in question’280 and that ‘[a]ny provision in an agreement which excludes 
any rights provided for in this Chapter is null and void’.281  
The CPA, however, requires a deeper analysis. Section 5 clearly states that the 
Act applies to a transaction occurring within South Africa. Section 48 contains a 
general prohibition against suppliers offering, marketing and negotiating in an unfair, 
unjust or unreasonable manner, and requiring consumers to waive their rights or the 
supplier’s obligations under unfair, unreasonable or unjust contract terms. A term or 
agreement is deemed to be unfair, unreasonable or unjust if it is excessively one-
sided against the person to whom goods or services are supplied; is inequitable, or 
the consumer relied on a misrepresentation; the transaction itself was subject to a 
term or notice that was unfair, unreasonable, unjust or unconscionable; or such term 
was not properly brought to the attention of the consumer.282  
Regulation 44 lists terms that are presumed not to be fair and reasonable. A 
term in a consumer agreement between a supplier operating for profit and acting 
mainly for business and a consumer who concluded the agreement for reasons mostly 
unrelated to their business will be presumed to be unfair if it, amongst others, 
‘provid[es] that a law other than that of the Republic applies to a consumer 
agreement concluded and implemented in the Republic, where the consumer was 
residing in the Republic at the time when the agreement was concluded.’283  
Neither the section nor the regulations explicitly state whether all choices of 
foreign law are automatically deemed to be unfair, unjust or unreasonable, with the 
result that it would be arguable on a ‘choice by choice’ basis whether, in that 
particular instance, the choice of foreign law was unjust.  
Regulation 44 appears to restrict parties’ ability to agree to foreign law as the 
proper law where the consumer is a South African resident not acting for business 
purposes and the supplier is acting for profit and in line with their profession, and the 
consumer contract is concluded and implemented here. The presumption that such a 
clause is unfair or unreasonable would not apply if either one of the requirements 
was not met (for instance, it is concluded and implemented here but the South 
African consumer was residing in England at the time, or the supplier is a bowling 
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club not acting for profit). In such instances, the choice of foreign law must be tested 
to determine whether it is unfair, unjust or unreasonable in the circumstances. 
The consumer could then approach the court for an order declaring the term 
unjust, which could also require compensation or for the supplier to cease using such 
a term.284 
Section 51 deals with prohibited transactions, terms and agreements. A supplier 
is prohibited from insisting on terms that defeat the purposes or policy of the Act, 
deprive a consumer of their rights, avoid their obligations or otherwise authorise the 
supplier to do anything outside of the bounds, or in avoidance of, the Act.285 Such 
terms or agreements are void.286  
Read together, these provisions prohibit parties in certain circumstances from 
contracting out of the protections of the Act (including its territorial scope) by 
selecting foreign law to apply to the agreement. Such clause would be presumed 
unfair or unreasonable, and the supplier would bear the onus of proving otherwise.   
Transactions falling beyond the scope of section 48 read with regulation 44 
may still be prohibited (under section 51), unfair or unreasonable if they purport to 
avoid the protections of the Act. Conversely, it could be argued that a choice of 
foreign law, although ostensibly attempting to contract out of the protections of the 
Act, and therefore void under section 51(3), is nonetheless permitted if the foreign 
law contains greater protections than the CPA. This would be consistent with the 
approach of the ECJ in Unamar.287 
Instruction can be drawn from Unamar on how to determine whether a law is 
mandatory or not. It will be recalled that the decision requires national courts of 
member states in the EU to take account of the exact terms of the proposed 
mandatory law, its general structure and all the circumstances surrounding the 
enactment of the law to determine whether it is mandatory in light of the intention of 
the legislature to protect an essential interest. 
What are the exact terms of the CPA?288 Essentially, the CPA provides for 
the protection of fundamental economic and social rights based on the Bill of Rights 
through a number of provisions aimed at balancing market inequities, particularly 
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inequalities in bargaining power which characterised the B2C experience. Linked to 
its terms is the general structure of the Act, which enjoys consistency and 
harmonious support of the rights-based approach.289 The structure of the Act is 
logical and reference is made to the Constitutional (and other) aims it seeks to 
address, and the international norms that were considered. The preamble is clear on 
the historical context in which the CPA was enacted, and the circumstances in which 
the Act was deemed necessary to protect vital interests. 
Once it has been determined that a particular law is mandatory, and it is 
submitted that the CPA would indeed be considered mandatory on this analysis, one 
can delve into the nuances of non-derogable versus overriding mandatory provisions 
which have already been highlighted.290  
Under the first meaning (of non-derogable rights that absolutely cannot be 
avoided), the CPA embodies vital rights in the public interest – those of weak parties 
which have been historically economically and socially abused. As such, its 
provisions cannot be contracted out of or otherwise avoided.   
If the second meaning of mandatory is ascribed (under which overriding rules 
may displace the otherwise applicable law if there is a clear intention to do so), it 
might be possible for the parties to avoid the provisions of the Act should they reach 
clear agreement. Where there is no such agreement (and the court has to determine 
the closest and most real connection to the contract), the CPA would trump the 
otherwise applicable law. 
This is tested with reference to three practical examples. 
 Three practical examples  II
(a) Ordinary B2C transactions 
Ordinary trades in South Africa between businesses and their customers (those 
who are not excluded) are hit squarely by the Act, including those with a cross-
border element. An example is the sale of rare books by a Botswanan seller to a 
South African individual purchaser, with a choice of Botswanan law.   
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(i) Jurisdiction and choice of court or consent clause 
Before a choice of law can be considered, the court seized with the matter must 
have jurisdiction. As was discussed above,291 jurisdiction may be ousted by a consent 
clause that refers the dispute to a particular forum, in order to circumvent weaker-
party protections. Such clauses may thus provide a simple and effective means of 
eliminating the potential application of the CPA.  In South Africa, these clauses are 
not immutable: they may be open to challenge on the basis of, inter alia, public 
policy and the constitutionally guaranteed right of access to justice.  
A consumer could therefore argue in the South African courts that public 
policy would be violated, and their right of access to justice unjustifiably infringed, if 
the supplier was allowed to rely on a consent clause (usually in the form of a clause 
tucked at the end of a standard form contract) to avoid the fundamental and 
constitutionally entrenched rights embodied in the CPA and designed for the specific 
purpose of protecting consumers.292  
Only once the court has determined it has jurisdiction can it consider any 
further choices or the determination of the proper law. 
(ii) Choice of law 
The choice of Botswanan law does not singularly avoid the provisions of the 
CPA, especially if action is instituted in South Africa. Provided jurisdiction can be 
established, the mandatory provisions of South African law as the lex fori will 
apply.293 Furthermore, and irrespective of what meaning a court ascribes to the term 
‘mandatory law’, it is submitted that the Act will constitute mandatory law that must 
be applied in favour of the consumer.  
Under the first meaning (that postulating non-derogable rights that cannot be 
avoided), the CPA embodies vital rights in the public interest – those of weak parties. 
As such, its provisions cannot be contracted out of or otherwise avoided.294 If the 
second meaning of mandatory is ascribed (under which overriding rules displace the 
otherwise applicable law), it might be possible for the parties to avoid the provisions 
of the Act should they reach a clear agreement on this point. Where there is no such 
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agreement (and the court has to determine the closest and most real connection to the 
contract), the CPA would trump the otherwise applicable law. 
The sale constitutes a transaction that is subject to the Act, and no exclusions 
apply to limit the extent of the protections of the CPA. This is because it concerns a 
transaction that occurs within South Africa295 – an element (delivery) took place 
here. The purchaser would thus be entitled to the benefits of the Act, including the 
right to return defective goods.296 If the situation was reversed, and the supplier was 
in South Africa, and the consumer in Botswana, the same should apply: because the 
transaction occurred in South Africa, it is irrelevant where the consumer was based at 
the time, and the sale would be subject to the Act. 
The same would not apply if, for instance, the purchaser was a large book 
retailer with an annual turnover or asset value in excess of R2 million – the 
transaction would be beyond the scope of the Act.  
The choice of foreign law would also be presumed to be unfair297 if the choice 
was made and implemented here. If the agreement was concluded in Botswana (for 
example, the seller made the offer to sell and the purchaser’s acceptance reached the 
seller in Botswana), then the presumption would not apply. 
However, should the chosen foreign law contain consumer protections that 
supercede those under the CPA, it is submitted that the consumer would be entitled 
to claim the greater protections, as was successfully achieved by the weaker party in 
Unamar. Party autonomy would thus be justifiably limited.298 
(iii) Transaction occurring outside of South Africa and relevance of choice 
On a strict reading of section 5, if a transaction did not occur within South 
Africa, the Act would not apply. If the transaction took place entirely outside of 
South Africa (both the seller and purchaser being in Botswana, and the contract 
concluded, performed and the goods paid for in Botswana) but the parties chose 
South African law to apply, as the transaction did not ‘[occur] within the 
Republic’,299 the protections under the CPA would seemingly not apply.  
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It is submitted the court should adopt a purposive approach to its interpretation 
and find that a consumer is entitled to the protections of the Act, notwithstanding the 
fact that the transaction took place outside the country.300 This is because the courts 
are enjoined to promote the spirit and purposes of the CPA, and are empowered to 
make innovative orders to advance the realisation of the rights and protections of the 
Act.301 The Act is explicit in its purpose to protect weaker parties, improve 
consumers’ economic interests, and ultimately improve social and economic 
inequalities.302 This can only be achieved if a purposive approach is taken to the 
interpretation and application of the Act. It is submitted that this would be the correct 
approach, and the Act may nevertheless apply. 
Furthermore, if any provision of the CPA is capable of different reasonable 
meanings within their context, the Act requires the court to adopt the meaning that 
‘best promotes the spirit and purposes of th[e] Act, and will best improve the 
realisation and improvement of consumer rights generally’, specifically those of the 
elderly, minors, people in rural areas and otherwise vulnerable or disadvantaged 
consumers.303 This argument could be made in favour of both non-derogable and 
overriding mandatory law. 
The definition of ‘court’ is not limited to South African courts; only consumer 
courts are specifically excluded from that definition. Therefore, regardless of 
whether a South African or foreign court was approached, the same purposive 
interpretation should be adopted and the version that is most advantageous and 
beneficial to the consumer should be favoured, in the event that the Act does apply as 
mandatory law under the conflict rules of the forum. 
Similar circumstances involving the EU are not difficult to imagine: for 
instance, a German property developer sells the contents of a South African holiday 
home to an Irish purchaser. The Irish purchaser can elect to sue the seller in Irish 
courts304, and Rome I applies to determine the proper law which would either be 
chosen or assigned as the law where the consumer is habitually resident. A choice of 
law would not oust the mandatory protections of the CPA, which is applicable due to 
                                                
300 I Laher ‘The Consumer Protection Act and cross-border transactions’ Polity.org website. If the Act 
does not apply in these circumstances, the common law would apply which would not necessarily be 
unfair. 
301 Section 4(2)(b)(i) and (ii). 
302 Preamble. 
303 The full group is set out in section 3(1)(b). 
304 Rome I (n27) articles 15,16 and 17. 
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the fact that delivery takes place in South Africa.305 Because at least three countries 
are connected to the transaction, article 3 of Rome I would not apply whether a law is 
chosen or assigned (the CPA would thus not be seen as absolutely unavoidable). 
Article 9(1) would apply, in terms of which it could be argued that the CPA contains 
overriding provisions that cannot be contracted around because of their importance in 
safeguarding the socio-economic rights of consumers in South African transactions. 
(iv) No choice of law 
If the book sale agreement was silent on choice of law, the governing law 
would have to be determined by the conflict of law rules of the court with 
jurisdiction to hear the matter. This could feasibly be a South African or, more likely, 
a Botswanan court in the current example. The courts of either of these countries 
would adopt a similar approach (earlier it was highlighted that Botswanan law is 
aligned with South African law in this arena306) and will seek to establish the law the 
parties ought to have chosen,307 or the country with the most real connection to the 
contract.308 At commercial arbitration under the ICC for one, the arbitrator would be 
tasked with determining the law which was most appropriate,309 alternatively that 
with the most real connection.  
Should the enquiry determine that South African law governs the agreement, 
the Act will certainly apply. Even if the transaction did not occur within South 
Africa, the Act may nevertheless continue to apply on a purposive interpretation of 
the legislation. 
If it transpires that Botswana (or another foreign country) has the closest and 
most real connection to the contract, and the transaction takes place entirely outside 
of South Africa, the answer is clear: the CPA is not applicable. However, if an 
element of the transaction occurs in South Africa (for instance if the contract was 
concluded here and all other elements were to take place in Botswana), the Act will, 
as would be the case when a foreign law is chosen by the parties, constitute 
mandatory non-derogable law that must be applied in favour of the consumer. Even 
on a looser interpretation of ‘mandatory’ that considers certain provisions capable of 
                                                
305 The transaction thus ‘occurs’ here - section 5(1). 
306 Chapter 3, part III. 
307 Efroiken (n83). 
308 Bonython (n91), Improvair (n92). 
309 Article 21, ICC rules (n191). 
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overriding the governing law if they are of social, economic or political importance 
to the authoring legislature, if there is no agreement on choice of law, the CPA will 
override the otherwise applicable law. 
(v) Summary 
Table A provides a broad summary of the above discussion. It takes account of 
the variables of choice of law, an absence of choice, whether or not the transaction 
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The CPA will apply (the question of 
whether it is a mandatory law does not 
arise). 
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interpretation of the Act. 
However, on a literal, 
restrictive interpretation of 
the definitions clause 
(however unlikely), the 
Act would not apply but 
South African common 




The CPA will apply, as it is non-
derogable mandatory law which 
cannot be avoided by the parties no 
matter how clear their intention. If the 
CPA is interpreted as overriding 
legislation, the parties’ intention must 
be unequivocal and clear in order to 
oust the application of the Act. Tacit 
or implied intention, it is submitted, 
would not suffice. In addition, in a 
classic consumer sale, attempts to 
contract out of the Act by appointing 
foreign law are presumed unfair, and 
may also be prohibited and therefore 
void.310 
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and foreign law would 
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The CPA will apply, as it is non-
derogable mandatory law which 
cannot be avoided by the parties no 
matter how clear their intention. Even 
if the CPA was considered only an 
overriding mandatory law (which the 
parties could avoid provided their 
intention is clearly enough expressed), 
the unequivocal intention to oust the 
provisions of the Act is not present. 
The CPA would not apply. 
In the absence of any link 
to South Africa, it cannot 
be considered as 
mandatory in either sense.  
 




(b) Franchise agreements 
Read with the definition of ‘consumer’, which includes a franchisee in a 
franchise agreement, 312 the South African franchise industry is governed by section 
7 and regulation 2.313  
A franchise agreement is concluded between a franchisor and franchisee under 
which the franchisee pays the franchisor, who grants to the franchisee the right to 
carry on business under the franchisor’s system or marketing plan within the whole 
or a specific part of South Africa. The operation of the franchisee’s business will be 
closely associated with the branding and advertising owned or licensed by the 
                                                
311 It is submitted that the same principles would apply at commercial arbitration, subject to the reality 
that arbitral fora differ from courts in civil litigation. Arbitrators are not limited by a court’s national 
rules and have greater freedom to determine which law has the closest connection to the contract. 
However, the arbitrability of the dispute may be impacted by the protective nature of the legislation - 
B Audit ‘How Do Mandatory Rules of Law Function in International Civil Litigation?’ in Mandatory 
Rules in International Arbitration 53 at 54. Further discussion is beyond the scope of this analysis. 
312 Section 5(6)(b)-(e). 
313 Although the bulk of the Act applies to franchise agreements concluded after the effective date, 
franchise agreements concluded prior to 1 April 2011are subject to a limited application of the Act - 
Schedule 2(3)(2). 
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franchisor. The agreement itself regulates the business relationship between the 
franchisor and franchisee, including the goods or services to be supplied to the 
franchisee.314 
Franchisees (even if juristic persons) operating beyond the R2 million 
threshold315 are not excluded from the protections of the Act as consumers: 
franchisees are understood to be in a weaker bargaining position than franchisors316 
and are thus deserving of protection regardless of their annual turnover or asset 
value. 
The CPA contains explicit requirements on a minimum, baseline level of 
standards that franchise agreements (as defined) must meet. Certain disclosures must 
be made in plain language, upfront in a written agreement which must contain 
prescribed information.317 A failure to follow the regulatory prescriptions will render 
the offending provision(s) void.318 
The Act and regulations also require every franchise agreement to contain 
clauses aimed at preventing unreasonable fees or consideration being paid, and 
unreasonable conduct between parties relating to the risks and legitimate business 
interests of the franchisor, franchisee and the franchise system as a whole.319 
Franchise agreements in terms of which franchise operations will take place 
within South Africa will therefore be subject to the CPA. The Act is not intended to 
apply to franchise businesses operating outside of South Africa, even if the 
franchisee is South African. The definition of ‘franchise agreement’ explicitly 
grounds the provisions of the Act ‘within all or a specific part of the Republic’.320 
This clear geographical stamp is absent in the provisions dealing with the general 
application of the Act. A franchise operation carrying on business beyond the South 
African borders would therefore not be subject to the provisions, and nor would the 
franchisee enjoy the protections, of the CPA.  
                                                
314 Section 1. 
315 Section 6. 
316 N Mellville ‘The Consumer Protection Act Made Easy’ (2010) 1 at 111. 
317 See regulation 2(3) for a comprehensive list on the information a franchise agreement must contain 
at a minimum. 
318 Regulation 2(2)(e). 
319 Regulation 2(2)(b). 
320 Section 1. 
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If South African law was the applicable law, once again the CPA would not 
apply (for the same reasons), and the dispute would fall to be dealt with under the 
common law. 
However, if an international hamburger franchisor intended to establish or 
develop its South African footprint through the use of the franchise model, the 
agreement must comply with the provisions of the Act and its regulations, which 
include the termination of such agreements by the parties. The effect of the 
prohibition on terms that are excessively one-sided, or inequitable to the consumer 
mean that franchisors can no longer simply create a convenient ‘escape hatch’ based 
on trivial reasons to cancel a franchise agreement.321    
Much like the choice of a foreign law cannot oust the provisions of the CPA in 
a B2C sale, neither will such a choice limit the application of the Act in franchise 
deals. If a foreign law is chosen or determined, the Act should be interpreted as being 
non-derogable mandatory law which cannot be avoided, regardless of the parties’ 
intention to contract out of this.322 In the event that the Act is interpreted to be merely 
overriding mandatory law, it is possible that it could be avoided by a clear expression 
of this intention. However, as has already been argued, a literal interpretation of the 
Act would be counter to the unambiguous aims and intentions of the legislature.323 
(c) Product liability 
Section 61 of the CPA governs product liability cases causing death, injury, 
illness or loss or physical damage to property – these are no longer governed by the 
common law. The provisions apply to producers, importers, distributors or retailers 
(as defined) of goods324 irrespective of whether the Act applies generally and 
regardless of the R2 million threshold, and other exempt categories, for consumers. 
They will be liable for any harm suffered by a consumer due to the supply of unsafe 
goods; product failure defect or a hazard in the goods; or inadequate instructions or 
warnings being provided with the goods. Such liability will accrue ‘irrespective of 
whether the harm resulted from any negligence on the part of the producer, importer, 
                                                
321 Section 40(1), section 48(2). 
322 Section 51 and regulation 44. 
323 As has been canvassed above, the franchisee could argue as a preliminary point that a consent 
clause ostensibly ousting the jurisdiction of the South African courts should be rejected to the extent 
that it is contra bonos mores or unconstitutional. 
324 ‘Services’ are notably absent from the section and the provisions will therefore not apply to 
liability for damage caused by services. 
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distributor or retailer, as the case may be’.325 The Act has therefore been said to 
impose a ‘strict liability framework’ on producers, importers, distributors and 
retailers, a defining characteristic when one considers that the common law requires 
fault (in the form of negligent or intentional conduct) as a pre-requisite for delictual 
liability.  
The case of Wagener v Pharmacare326 highlighted the near impossible task 
claimants faced in proving fault in product liability cases under the common law. 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Appeal declined to develop the common law to 
impose strict liability on a manufacturer of anaesthetic drugs, deciding to leave the 
necessary investigations and analysis for this development to the legislature. The 
enactment of section 61 is the result of that invitation. 
The provisions of section 61 only apply to death, injury, illness or loss or 
physical damage to property and related economic losses. Recourse to the common 
law remains the only avenue for cases involving pure economic loss. 
Certain defences may be raised. Defendants could avoid liability if the hazard, 
failure or defect is due to compliance with public regulation; the hazard, failure or 
defect did not exist at the time it was supplied to that defendant or arose wholly due 
to their compliance with instructions; it is unreasonable for that defendant to have 
discovered the hazard, failure or defect given their role in the supply chain; or more 
than three years have passed since the death or injury of a natural person, or the 
discovery of the material facts of an illness, loss or damage or related economic 
loss.327 
Liability is joint and several, and claimants are free to act against any 
participant in the supply chain; there is no requirement to pursue the producer first, 
for instance.328 Rather, the onus will be on the liable defendant(s) to recover their 
respective loss up the supply chain, and subject to any limitations of liability that 
might have been agreed upon between suppliers.329 
As Loubser and Reid explain, the Act ‘… furthers the important objective of 
facilitating access to justice for all consumers; consumers who find it difficult to 
                                                
325 Section 61(1). 
326 Wagener v Pharmacare Ltd; Cuttings v Pharmacare Ltd [2003] 2 All SA 167 (SA). 
327 Section 61(4)(a)-(d). 
328 Section 61(3). 
329 M Loubser and E Reid Product Liability in South Africa (2012) 1 at 120-121. 
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bring a claim against the producer are… offered a readily accessible choice of 
defendants to pursue’.330  
A ‘producer’ includes any person who grows, mines, generates, creates, 
manufactures or otherwise produces goods within South Africa, or who applies a 
mark on the goods, with the intention of supplying the goods within the ordinary 
course of business.331 An ‘importer’ is any person who brings goods into South 
Africa with the intention of supplying the goods in the ordinary course of business. 
This definition allows a South African consumer to pursue the importer under section 
61 when they cannot easily identify a foreign producer, subject to the statute’s 
defences. The importer would then have to explore recovering that loss up the supply 
chain; it would not be the responsibility of the consumer to establish which party was 
at fault and when. 
A ‘distributor’ is any person who, in the ordinary course of business, is 
supplied with any goods by a producer, importer or other distributor and on-supplies 
the goods to another distributor or a retailer. A ‘retailer’ is a person who supplies the 
goods to the consumer in the ordinary course of business. As has been discussed,332 
the definition of ‘supply’ is extremely wide and there is no requirement that the 
supplier must reside or have its principal place of business in South Africa. It is 
therefore possible, subject to the rules on jurisdiction, that a foreign supplier could be 
sued and held liable under section 61.  
If, for instance, a South African textile company purchased an industrial 
sewing machine directly from a Dutch manufacturer, which was defective, causing a 
fire and significant damage, at first glance the Act would not apply. This is because 
the manufacturer does not fit the definition of ‘producer’ – it did not manufacture or 
produce the goods within South Africa. However, it would be considered a retailer 
and therefore subject to the Act as it supplied the goods to the textile company within 
the ordinary course of its business. If the supply agreement had contained a choice of 
law clause selecting a foreign law to apply, the provisions of the CPA would apply as 
non-derogable, mandatory law and potentially in terms of section 51 if the choice 
was to avoid the application of the Act. Any limitations of liability permitted under 
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that foreign law would not survive the provisions of the Act and the retailer would be 
held liable, subject to any statutory defences which may be raised. 
The situation would be different if the Dutch manufacturer had sold the 
machine to an importer which on-supplied it to the textile company. In that case, the 
textile company would previously (under the common law and prior to the Act) have 
had a contractual claim against the importer only (which would likely have been 
limited in their agreement) and not the manufacturer. It would have had a delictual 
claim against the importer and manufacturer (subject to jurisdiction rules), but it 
would have had to prove the elements of conduct, fault, wrongfulness, causation and 
loss in order to succeed. Now, it can simply proceed against the importer in terms of 
section 61 despite any attempts to contractually limit liability and need not prove 
fault. The importer would then seek to recover its losses up the supply chain but, 
unlike the claim of the end-user (here, the textile company), the recovery would be 
subject to contractual limitations of liability and indemnities.  
To reiterate an earlier point, selecting foreign law as the proper law cannot 
assist foreign producers, suppliers or importers in avoiding the Act. Clauses that 
purport to do so are treated as prohibited, and therefore void. 
 Recognition and enforcement in South Africa of a foreign judgment or III
arbitral award without consideration of the CPA  
In addition to its application to a dispute before a court or arbitral tribunal, the 
CPA could be taken into account when recognition and enforcement of a court 
judgment or arbitral award is sought. Generally, countries will recognise others’ 
judgments, but certain restrictions apply. The New York Convention regulates the 
recognition of the vast majority of arbitral awards made across the world today, 
signatories’ courts will generally recognise and enforce foreign arbitral awards 
subject to seven grounds of refusal.333 
South African common law applies to the recognition and enforcement of all 
foreign judgments aside from those issued in Namibia.334 Under the common law, a 
foreign judgment is not directly enforceable in South Africa, but forms an 
independent cause of action. As such, it will be enforced by our courts provided the 
                                                
333 Article 5, UN Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958. 
334 The Enforcement of Foreign Civil Judgments Act, 32 of 1988 applies to designated countries. 
Namibia is the only country designated at present.  
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issuing court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute; the judgment is final and has 
not become superannuated; the judgment was not obtained fraudulently; the 
judgment does not involve enforcement of penal or revenue laws of a foreign state; 
that enforcement is not contrary to the Protection of Businesses Act;335 and that the 
recognition and enforcement would not be contrary to public policy.336 
Similar grounds for refusal are evident in the New York Convention. 
According to article 5, the onus is on the defendant/award debtor to establish that the 
arbitration agreement was invalid or the parties were incapacitated; they did not 
receive proper notice of the proceedings; the tribunal exceeded its powers; the 
composition of the tribunal was not in accordance with the parties’ agreement; or the 
award is not final or binding. The court may, mero motu, refuse to recognise the 
award if the subject matter of the arbitration was not arbitrable according to the law 
of the place of enforcement; or if to do so would be contrary to public policy. 
Public policy is a ground common to the refusal to recognise judgments and 
arbitral awards. Equally common is that neither procedure examines the merits of the 
decision itself. The balance between public policy and avoiding the merits of the 
award is not easily struck and courts must be cautious not to intrude into the 
sovereign territory of a foreign judiciary under the guise of the public policy ground 
for refusal.337 
The CPA is silent on the consequences of a judgment or arbitral award granted 
after application of consumer standards that are lower than those the consumer would 
have been entitled to under South African consumer legislation. The recognition and 
enforcement of such a judgment or award may be contrary to South African public 
policy; this is a question that has not been considered by our courts.  
If a foreign court has failed to take into account the provisions of the CPA in 
circumstances when these should have applied as mandatory (whether non-derogable 
or overriding), the court may not recognise the judgment (or award) and it may 
therefore not be enforceable on grounds of public policy or possibly a contravention 
of the Protection of Businesses Act.338 Forsyth points out, however, that a judgment 
will not be refused recognition on the basis that it is inconsistent with South African 
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law. The standard is much higher and ‘[r]ather, it must violate a fundamental policy 
of the law’.339 
It is submitted that a foreign decision that fails to take account of the welfare of 
the consumer in a transaction subject to the Act would be contra bonos mores, and a 
South African court would not apply it, unless greater protections were applied in the 
consumer’s favour. 
CHAPTER 7 : CONCLUSION 
 
The CPA was introduced to effect substantive change in consumers’ lives. This 
paper has concluded that its protections should generally apply whether the 
transaction is entirely local or there is a cross-border, international element.  
A background on the relevance of conflict of laws and the question of 
mandatory provisions was provided in Chapter Two. Building on this foundation, the 
global debate in which this area of law finds itself was contextualised in Chapter 
Three, whilst Chapter Four summarised the need for an enhanced consumer 
protection regime in South Africa in particular. Comparative experience was drawn 
upon to explain the reach of such provisions in different jurisdictions.  
The provisions of the Act itself regulate many instances of its application in 
international transactions where a choice of law has been made, whilst in other 
situations, the nature and purposes of the Act demand that it is respected and applied 
as non-derogable mandatory law. In yet other circumstances, the CPA should be 
treated as overriding mandatory law.  
The particular extent of the application of the Act can then be determined with 
reference to the Act itself – for instance, an exemption or threshold may apply. 
These, and other, questions were unpacked in Chapters Five and Six. 
It is clear that, no matter how clearly parties might express their intention for a 
foreign law to apply to their transaction and any disputes that may arise from it, their 
autonomy to do so may be limited by the CPA. The purposes and aims of the Act are 
tailored towards the essential upliftment of fundamental social and economic rights 
of consumers in the South African market, such that the provisions of the Act simply 
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cannot be avoided. The only exception to this position that can be foreseen is if the 
chosen foreign law allows the consumer greater protection. 
The consequences of a foreign court or arbitral forum ignoring or overlooking 
mandatory law have also been discussed: the judgment or award will not be 
recognised by our courts (and therefore is rendered unenforceable against the 
judgment debtor in South Africa) for being contra bonos mores. 
Private international law in Africa is very much still in a developmental phase, 
and increasing pressure will be put on it to address res nova questions.340 This paper 
aspires to positively contribute to the expanding discourse and analysis. 
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